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SAMMENDRAG 
Internasjonale forretninger er i dag begeistret over globaliseringen og ser verden som 
et stort marked uten grenser. Konseptet om det globale markedet ignorerer nasjonale 
ulikheter og de endringer som skjer i andre økonomier. Dette fører til at ledere møter 
utfordringer til tross for alle mulighetene som globaliseringen gir. 
 
Formålet med denne oppgaven er å utvide forståelsen av lederes utfordringer i 
overgangsøkonomier. Basert på dette case studiet av norske ledere i Kina, hvor 
utfordringen var forventet, investigerer denne oppgaven hvordan overgangen fra en 
relasjonsbasert til en regelbasert styringssystem utfordrer norske ledere, med et spesielt 
fokus på utfordringer i forhold til tillit.  
 
De empiriske funnene som er utført gjennom kvalitative dybdeintervju, indikerer at 
relasjoner (guanxi) er fortsatt viktig og påvirker den kinesiske forretningskulturen. Til 
tross for viktigheten av relasjoner (guanxi) har viktigheten av lover og regler økt. I 
diskusjonen vil hovedfokuset være på ”decoupling”. Hvor dette vil være spesielt 
interessant for ledere, på grunn av institusjonelle endringene som fører til mulighetene 
for ”decoupling”.  
 
Ved bruk av ulike teorier gis det mulighet til å se hvorfor utfordringene av skiftet fra et 
relasjonsbasert- til et regelbasert styringssystem ikke er så lett. For norske ledere 
handler dette ikke om å bevege seg fra en tilstand til en annen, men heller å finne en 
balanse.  
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PREFACE  
There is no doubt that the choice of the research topic and the research question was 
based on our personal motivation. A topic within international management was an 
obvious choice, as the main purpose for our educational degree we are pursuing is to 
be in a managerial position. Having a specialization in International Business, and an 
academic background in international management, did not only give us theoretical 
knowledge, but also practical insight through our exchange semester(s) in countries 
with different culture and students from across the world. We observed the modern 
business world in a different manner. Globalization has not only brought opportunities 
but also challenges for managers. This made us wondering and led us to the direction 
of our current topic. Multiple theories will in this respect help us to see the ongoing 
changes from different perspectives, which are ignored by globalization concept, and 
will strengthen our understanding of the phenomena.   
 
Hence, in order to illuminate and study the international business challenges, we 
needed a context with tensions. In this regard, Norway and China are not only 
geographically split, but also characterized by significant cultural and institutional 
distance.  
 
Being in contact with other researchers in this area, as well as doing pre-interviews, we 
learnt that institutional environment in China, that is currently under transition is a 
highly relevant and focused topic area. Additionally, being born and brought up in 
Norway with an Asian background was one of the reasons for choosing China over any 
other countries. We believe this will be an advantage, because we will be able to see 
and understand things from both the Chinese and the Norwegian perspective, which 
will give us a unique position as researchers. 
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ABSTRACT  
Today, international business is inspired by the idea of globalization and seeing the 
world as one big market, without borders. However, global market concept ignores 
national differences and the changing aspects of other economies. As a result, 
managers do face challenges despite of all the opportunities of globalization. The 
purpose of this study is to broaden the understanding of managers´ challenges in 
transition economies. Based on the case study of Norwegian managers in China, where 
tensions were expected, this research investigates how the transition from a relation-
based to a rule-based governance system challenges Norwegian managers, with a 
particular focus on trust challenges.  
 
The empirical findings conducted through qualitative in-depth interviews, indicate that 
although relations (guanxi) are still highly preserved and impact trust in today’s 
Chinese business culture, the importance of rule of law is now increasing. In the 
discussion the main focus will be on decoupling. In this respect, the findings are 
especially interesting for practitioners, regarding the opportunity of decoupling brought 
by institutional change.   
 
Application of multiple theories allow to see the challenges of why this shift from 
relation-based to rule-based doesn´t go so smooth. For Norwegian managers it´s not 
about moving from one state to another, but rather finding the balance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
Keywords: trust, China, transition economy, rule-based society, relation-based society, 
governance trust, institutional trust 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
China, is booming, which has led to it topping the world’s second largest economy in 
the world after USA (World Bank, 2014). With an increase in GDP of nearly ten 
percent a year for more than 35 years, China is today recognized as one of the powerful 
players globally (Isachsen, 2015). China is an attractive market for international 
business, as China has only opened up to a free market in the last 30 years through 
economic reform, which in turn has made international trade more promising. China 
has a great market potential and is a very attractive and interesting market for 
Norwegian companies, as it is one of the biggest markets and is the most important 
trading partner in Asia, especially in the field of production, purchasing and research & 
development (Utenriksdepartementet, 2007).  
 
To expand its economic relations with an emphasis on increased market access for 
Norwegian goods and services, and to promote Norwegian business interests, 
Norwegian expertise and Norwegian values in China, the Norwegian government 
introduced “The China-strategy” in 2007, which is still an ongoing project 
(Utenriksdepartementet, 2007). This indicates that in addition to the over 200 
Norwegian companies registered in China (Innovation Norway, 2014), it can be 
implied that their number will increase, as it will be easier to do business in China 
when the governments are on good terms.   
 
Although Norwegian companies in China have been growing, there is a fact that 
Norwegian managers are facing challenges to adjust and to succeed in China. 
Norwegian managers in China may find that what made them successful and effective 
back home may not work in their new settings (Kristoffersen, 2010). It may partially 
be explained by Hofstede´s national cultural dimensions theory, which categorizes 
Norway and China as opposed to each other, when it comes to national culture 
differences (Hofstede, 1980). One of the main differences between Norway and China 
is that Norway has more of a rule-based governance system, while China has more of a 
relation-based governance system (Li et al., 2004). This difference has significant 
impact on Norwegian managers who take the opportunity to work in China. The 
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importance of relations in China might not be very clear for Norwegians managers in 
general.  
 
However, the Norwegian Government has clearly understood and is endeavoring to 
face these challenges. After human rights, activist, Liu Xiabo, received the Nobel 
Peace Prize on October 8th 2010, the relationship between Norway and China has been 
difficult. The Chinese authorities chose to avoid the Norwegian government; hence, the 
negotiation on a free trade agreement between Norway and China was put on hold 
(Håkonsen and Sandvik, 2014), China requested an apology from the Norwegian 
government for the Nobel Peace Prize award. To ease the situation, when the former 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, Dalai Lama, came to visit Norway in May 2014 no 
members of the Norwegian Government met with him (Brende, 2014). The reason was 
clear, to not worsen the tense relations between and China. In this regard the China-
expert, Henning Kristoffersen stated: “From a Chinese perspective, it is a breach of 
trust. (…) If the Norwegian Government wants to regain a normal relationship with 
China, it must abstain from meeting Dalai Lama.” (Kristoffersen, 2012)  
 
Not only are relations and trust important for the Chinese in the political and social 
context, but also particularly in the business context (Kristoffersen 2010; Li et al. 
2004). Arnulf (2014) stated that personal relations (e.g. guanxi in China) are one of the 
success-factors in doing business in China. He underlines that companies´ knowledge 
and skills could bring managers far, but not as much as personal relations would: “…It 
means that companies can do everything by the book, but still fail if they are not 
certain about building relations that supports their activities.” (Farbrot, 2014). 
	  
It is clearly recognized that trust in the Chinese environment is different from the 
Western countries. As China is a relation-based society, trust is mostly built on 
relations (guanxi) and reciprocity. The Chinese notion of trust is not a matter of faith, 
but an exchange between parties in order to build mutual confidence (Huang and Bond, 
2012). In contrast to the Western countries, trust in business is mostly built by 
“contracts”, which means that written documents are signed by parties with binding 
effects (Luo, 2007). The main differences of trust rely on how people from different 
societies work towards building a trusting relationship (Huang and Bond, 2012). 
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As an emerging economy, China is going through radical transformations (Li, 2013). 
This transformation indicates profound change in both the economic and the political 
area of the national governance system. Politically, the move is from a quite dictatorial 
to more a democratic system. Economically, the change is from a rather closed and 
planned economy system to a more open, and market economy system (Li, 2009). In 
both, the move is from non-transparent, unpredictable and relation-based systems 
towards a more efficient rule-based system of governance, it is claimed. The challenge 
transition countries are now facing is how to move effectively from institutions of 
economic and political governance that tend to be highly relation-based to institutions 
that are more extensively rule-based. This transformation is said to be essential for a 
country´s long-term development process. The transformation progress of economic 
and political governance varies among countries, relative to the degree of internal 
resistance that comes from a country´s culture and history, which also includes legal 
heritage.  
The interesting part here is to understand what kind of challenges managers from a 
rule-based governance society face when doing business in a relation-based economy 
in transition. In this respect China fits very well to study this phenomenon. 
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1.1 Problem statement  
The concept of the transition from a relations-based to a rule-based governance system 
in China is relatively new; hence there is little research done on this topic. While 
several researchers have concluded that China has always had a relation-based 
governance system, and is now moving towards a rule-based governance system, few 
researchers have focused on how this transition is affecting foreign managers. This can 
be especially challenging for Norwegian managers that have a very different cultural 
background and a governance system compared to China. Therefore, this thesis is a 
case study of Norwegian managers doing business in China.  
 
Firstly, we assume that Norwegian managers face challenges when going from a rule-
based governance system to a relation-based governance system, as the institutional 
distance is immense (Li, 2009). Secondly, we assume that there is a double challenge 
when China is now under transition. The second challenge relates to puzzlement about 
how much of the prior rules, norms and values are preserved in organizations and how 
much of the new rules, norms and values are embraced in the organizations. Thus, it is 
interesting to know when and how much to rely and trust rules and regulations, and 
when and how much to rely and trust relations (guanxi). However, since the topic is 
very comprehensive and there are limited resources available, we will have to narrow 
the scope by focusing on challenges Norwegian managers face regarding trust relations 
when they do business in China.  
1.2 Research question 
Our research question originates from our aim to understand and give benefit to the 
newcomers, as well as current Norwegian managers working in China: in particular, to 
be prepared for the change they face and may face in the future regarding China’s 
transition from a rule-based governance society to a relation-based governance society. 
This aim will be used as an attempt to answer the following research question:  
 
How does China’s transition from a relation-based to a rule-based governance 
system challenge Norwegian managers´ trust relations when doing business in 
China? 
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The following sub-questions will be used as support to answer the main research 
question listed above:  
 
1. What challenges still exist?  
2. What challenges are brought by transition? 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. In order to give the reader a clear 
understanding of the choices that have been made throughout the whole thesis, a brief 
description of each chapter follows. 
 
The introduction of the topic and the research question is presented in Chapter 1. 
Chapter 2 explains the context of the case, which is China. Here, China’s historical 
concepts and the Chinese culture are described. Moreover, to recognize the contextual 
change, China´s transition is briefly presented. Chapter 3, suggests the theoretical 
framework, based on three different theories; Hofstede´s national cultural dimensions, 
governance theory and institutional theory, where each of them throw light on different 
aspects of the research problem and the concept of trust. In Chapter 4 the research 
method is discussed, where research design, choice and purpose of method are 
explained. The empirical findings of the research are presented in Chapter 5. The 
findings are explained with the regard to theoretical framework from Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 6 the findings are discussed through the prism of the theoretical lenses. 
Chapter 7 concludes and summarizes the main contribution of the thesis and brings 
forth practical implications, addresses limitations of the research and provides 
recommendations for further investigations.  
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CHAPTER 2 CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH: 
CHINA AS A RELATION-BASED ECONOMY IN 
TRANSITION 
 
“If you want one year of prosperity, cultivate grains. If you want ten years of 
prosperity, cultivate trees. If you want one hundred years of prosperity, cultivate 
people.”  (Chinese proverb)  
2.1 China´s historical and cultural baggage 
China has had the reputation of managing business activities and governing economic 
actions through personal relations for decades. However in the recent times China is 
moving towards a more rule-based governance system (Li et al., 2004). 
To understand China´s transition, it is important to understand the Chinese culture that 
determines the values, traditions and norms that are embedded in Chinese context. Not 
only is history important to learn from the past, but also because the present and the 
future are connected to the past (North, 1990).  
Chinese history has long roots, it being the longest shared culture on earth (Sheh, 
2003). Thus it is necessary to limit the discussion of its history to what is relevant for 
this paper. Clearly, one cannot hope go into specific details, however to point out 
certain basic ideas should be acceptable. Two main points to address are historical and 
cultural attitude to trust, and additionally, China in transition. This is what will be 
addressed in this Chapter. 
2.1.1 A brief History   
Since the majestic dynasty system of government has ruled in China for over 2000 
years, it has had enormous impact on the Chinese culture, and is still today a big part of 
the Chinese thinking (Chen and Lee, 2008). Various dynasties have ruled China; where 
each dynasty has fallen, another one has taken its place. However Mao´s dynasty with 
its Confucian thinking, had the most influence on Chinese culture, before Deng 
established open thinking and made it possible for international business (Chen and 
Lee, 2008; Kristoffersen, 2010; Sheh, 2003).   
	   7	  
There are three main schools, among the hundreds of schools of thought in the Chinese 
history (Sheh, 2003). The foundation of Chinese culture and its business environment 
are based upon these three major schools, and they are both in variance with and in 
contradiction to one another. This is why all of them are still practiced, depending on 
the situations. In the order of their establishments the schools are; Confucianism, 
Daoism (Taoism), and Buddhism (Kristoffersen, 2010; Sheh, 2003). 
 
Confucius, the great Chinese philosopher, is seen as the pioneer of Chinese civilization 
along with, Lao ZI, the found of Daoism (Fewsmith, 2010). Confucius focuses on 
hierarchical, friendly and logical society, where rules should be followed in consensus 
to ones political and social status; ethical codes and unwritten rules are used to realize 
these aims (Fewsmith, 2010). However, the study of Daoism involves how things 
happen and how things work, in other words, the principle that underlines all creation 
(Sheh, 2003: 6). In parallel, Buddhism aims to lead mankind to peace by reducing 
agony and developing good morals. A prominent difference between these three 
schools of thought is that Confucianism is humanistic; Taoism is naturalistic; 
Buddhism is spiritualistic (Sheh, 2003). In later times, Taoism and Buddhism have 
integrated into Confucianism. This integration represents Neo-Confucianism, which 
has the greatest impact on the Chinese thinking (Chen and Lee, 2008; Sheh, 2003).  
2.1.2 China´s cultural values 
Confucianism is also called Chinese traditional culture, due to the impact of the 
Confucius period on Chinese history. It is a set of guidelines for proper behavior 
(Hofstede 1991). The Chinese social structure is based on the five fundamental 
relations; Husband and wife, father and son, siblings, sovereign and subject, and 
between friends (Sheh, 2003). This social structure derives from Confucius thinking 
and gives meaning to the Confucius saying “let the ruler act like a ruler, the subject do 
his duty as a subject, the father fulfill his responsibilities of a father, and the son be 
obedient as a son should be” (Chan and Young, 2011: 24). This view indicates that 
people´s roles and places in a society are different and given. It directly characterizes 
Chinese hierarchical society. Harmony is achieved when everyone obeys their civic 
duties (Lau and Young, 2013). These are rules that are followed because of the 
Chinese norms and values, rather than any written law.  
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The family is the basic unit, but the development and progress of society is based on 
network expansion. The Chinese family unit holds great importance: all the members 
aim to ensure a high regard for the family name, by working devotedly, staying thrifty 
and prudent, and by sacrificing personal interests to the benefits of their families. Inter-
personal relationships (guanxi) can be related to etiquette, especially towards the elders 
in the society. Aggression and resentments of elders is repressed and disagreements are 
avoided, hence harmony is favored. The Chinese believe that one´s destiny is 
predestined, at least to some extent. Another basic assumption is that everything is 
inter-related; hence everything depends on everything else. As mentioned, the Chinese 
culture is derived from the Confucianism in which relations (guanxi) are the main 
factor to gain trust in all aspects (Li, 2009). 
 
2.1.3 The importance of relations (guanxi) in China  
The term “guanxi” (關係) (pronounced gwan-shee) is a special relationship and/or 
connection between persons (Luo, 2007).  The “guan” means “a door” or “to close up”, 
and can be metaphorically explained by a person who is inside the door belonging to 
the group, whilst someone outside the door does not. The “xi” stands for the ties 
between individuals or organizations (Ambler and Xi, 2009). Thus guanxi involves 
attracting and expanding connections in order to secure favors in personal relations 
(Luo, 2007). It can also be explained as an informal, particularistic personal connection 
between two individuals who are bounded by an implicit psychological contract. 
Guanxi is maintained by following the social norms, such as long-term relationships, 
mutual commitment, loyalty, and obligations (Chen et al., 2004).  
 
Luo (2007) specified seven principles as the bases for the content of guanxi:  
 
- Transferable: Transfer of guanxi is determined by how introduction is done. If 
Person A has guanxi with person B, and B does not introduce his friend C 
properly to person A, contact between A and C is doubtful. Hence, satisfaction 
of introduction felt by both parties determines the success of transferability.  
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- Reciprocal: Guanxi is a give and take concept; hence rejection to return a favor 
is considered unreliable and untrustworthy. 
 
- Intangible: As guanxi is built on expectation of future exchange of favors, it is 
considered intangible. 
 
- Utilitarian: A guanxi relation is rather practical than emotional, as it is easily 
broken when exchange and mutual benefits are not involved. 
 
- Contextual: Forming and upholding of guanxi is contextual, as it is the situation 
that decides whether a gift is seen as bribe or not. 
 
- Long-term: Guanxi relations are long-term, and can even continue from one 
generation to another, if preserved properly. 
 
- Personal: Personal relations build guanxi between organizations, consequently 
the organization loses guanxi when the connector leaves; hence guanxi has no 
group effect. 
 
Not only are relations important for favor exchanges but also when choosing business 
partners, investors or suppliers. Yeung and Tung´s (1996) study indicated that over 80 
percent of managers in China considered trust as a vital condition for guanxi, and that 
guanxi could not exist without it. To access the required crucial information for 
investment, partnership and other business purposes three main factors are crucial (Li 
et al., 2004; Li, 2009): 
 
1. The actor´s history and reputation (ex ante monitoring information). 
2. His financial status and profit prospects (interim monitoring information). 
3. His identity and assets (ex post monitoring information) 
 
These factors are needed to know whether X has a bad record in business dealings, 
whether X is capable of doing something he/she is indicating, and in case of failure, 
where to find X and claim assets. In addition, to having good relationships, the “face” 
is to be developed and maintained at all costs (Li, 2009). 
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2.1.4 The Chinese mianzi (face) 
Mianzi is the Chinese word for “face” (面子) as in to lose “face”, and the concept 
relates to an individual´s reputation, credibility and self-respect (Chen, 2001). Chen 
(2001) stated that, “It (Mianzi) denotes a social standing based on one’s character and 
reputation within a given social group” (Chen, 2001: 72). Mianzi is a ritualized way of 
showing and receiving respect, which allows the formal building of relationships and 
mutual trust, hence having a mianzi gives advantages such as good credit history, or 
social currency in business and social circles (Chen, 2001). 
 
Mianzi is a concept that exists in relation to others, which means that it has to be 
reciprocated. If people give you mianzi, you would have to do the same: this would be 
perceived as honorable and strengthen the business relationship (Chen, 2001). 
The more mianzi one has, the easier one can develop more guanxi; thereby xinyong 
(trust) gets stronger. Hence, the “face” concept influences the behavior of individuals, 
both in a private and in business context. Therefore, every individual seeks great 
achievements and public recognition, in order to have and maintain a good name for 
himself and his family.  
 
By developing guanxi and saving mianzi, xinyong (trust) is created between persons 
and is one of the critical components for the long-term success in a relationship, which 
forms the foundation of business networks in China (Ambler et al., 2009).  By having 
xinyong (trust), decisions between people is easier because there is no formal process 
or due diligence that is required (Redding, 1990). Further, the Chinese notion of trust is 
not a matter of faith, but an exchange between parties in order to build mutual 
confidence (Chen, 2001). For non-family members, trust has to be built while for 
family members xinyong is given (Tong, 1996).   
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2.2 China as a transition economy   
Political changes in a country, such as fall of communism, have resulted in economic 
reforms, thus opening up markets and international trade. Countries that have opened 
up markets are the ones facing institutional changes (Jansson et al., 2007). China along 
with Russia are examples of such countries.  
China has undergone significant changes from a planned economy to a market 
economy with socialist features since 1979. China introduced market forces and 
established new economic laws and regulation, which aimed for a more democratic 
system and to protect property rights, and divesting the government from businesses 
(Li, 2013).  
 
The development and changes of corporate governance are shown in table 1 and can be 
arranged into three phases: 1983-1992, 1993-1997 and 1998 to present. 
 
Table 1 Transition phase and changes, developed by authors 
Transition phase Changes 
1983-1992 -­‐ Development of a more market-based (Stock 
exchange) (Ho, 2003c).  
1993-1997 -­‐ Company law – major legal requirements  -­‐ Opening up for private ownership (Li, 2013). 
1998- now  -­‐ The Securities Law: China´s Corporate Governance 
development. -­‐ Accounting Law changes  -­‐ Publishing rules for: establishment of modern 
enterprise, code of corporate governance and 
guidelines for listed companies (Ho, 2003c). 
 
 
Recently, on the 11th December 2001 China became a member of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), which caused China to commit to a system based on a market 
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economy and the rule of law (Gold, 2004). WTO works to remove barriers to trade and 
create a forum for negotiations between countries where they can resolve trade-related 
disputes. The purpose is to increase international trade by advocating the liberal 
ideology of belief in the free market (Gold, 2004). Five years later, China adopted the 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS), which provides more stringent 
standards and open criteria for the public to access and evaluate a firm’s financial 
information (Li, 2013). The fact that China is converging toward IFRS shows that the 
Chinese stock market is increasingly relying on publicly released financial information 
(Qu et al., 2012).  
 
A powerful driving force that has contributed to the transition is the Chinese work 
force (BSR, 2012). The social security system and rights have strengthened through the 
implementation of a number of laws and regulations such as: “Labor Contract Law”, 
“Labor Dispute Meditation and Arbitration Law” and “Regulations on the Negotiation 
and Mediation of Enterprises” (BSR, 2012). 
 
Changes in the labor contract law have caused all employees to have a written contract 
(fixed term, continuing, or contract for a specific task) that contains working hours, 
overtime pay, fees, social insurance, employment, probation and teaching. It also 
requires time-limited contracts that should be turned into indefinite or open-ended 
contracts after the other renewal. The new law prohibits more than 36 hours overtime 
per month and the minimum wages are RMB 1500 in Shenzhen (1400 Norwegian 
kroner).  
 
All these changes towards a more transparent and open system can show that China is 
in transition. WTO membership and implementation of IFRS are great steps towards a 
more open system for international investors and businesses. Even the changes in 
labour law signify that there are internal changes in China. Li (2013) has examined the 
Chinese governance system over time to evaluate China´s transition by using two 
tools; The Economic Freedom index (1980-2012) and the World Bank´s World Wise 
Governance Indicators (1996-2013). 
 
The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) measures the degree to which the policies and 
institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom in five broad parts 
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(Gwartney et al., 2014). These are: 1) size of government; 2) legal system and property 
rights; 3) sound money, 4) freedom to trade internationally, and 5) regulation. Li 
(2013) examines China’s transition in three areas; legal system and property rights, 
freedom to trade internationally and regulation. A summary rating from these shows 
that China’s EFI has grown from 3,64 in 1980 to 6,39 in 2012. 
 
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measures six governance 
indicators (World Bank, 2013): 
 
Voice and Accountability: The degree of a country´s citizens´ participation in selection 
of their government. In addition, the freedom of speech, freedom of association and 
independent media.  
 
Political stability and Absence of Violence/terrorism: Political insatiability, that 
includes terrorism.  
 
Government Effectiveness: The quality of public and civil services, and the degree of 
their independence from political pressures and the government’s commitment to the 
implemented policies.  
 
Regulatory Quality: Formulation and implementation of sound rules and regulations 
that allows and supports private sector development.   
 
Rule of Law: The trust and acceptance of the rules of societies by agents. Rules such as 
contract enforcement, property rights, independent police and courts, in addition to the 
probability of crime.  
 
Control of Corruption: The degree of exercising public power for private gains that 
includes all forms of corruption.  
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Figure 1: Governance Indicators, 1996-2013, Source: World Bank, 2013 
 
 
From 1996 to 2013 it can be seen that China’s governance indicators in Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/terrorism, Government Effectiveness, and Rule of 
Law have been retreating after becoming more rule-based. Li (2013) clarified that 
China’s transition (or lack of it) is emerging. China´s economic reform shows its great 
effort towards more public rules (Li et al., 2004; Li, 2013). As China has made great 
strides towards becoming an institution with more public rules, the government has 
become bigger and more powerful due to the lack of accountability, which in turn fuels 
corruption (Li, 2013). 
 
The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries based on how corrupted the public 
sector is recognized to be. The degree of a scale goes from 0 to100, where highly 
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corrupt countries are 0, while a scale of 100 is very low. Table 2 shows that China 
compared to Norway have higher corruption, with a score of 86 in 2014. Even 
compared to other countries, China´s ranking indicates high corruption with a rank no. 
100. In contrast, Norway is ranked as no. 5 (Transparency, 2014). 
 
 
Table 2 Corruption perception index 2014, Source: Transparency, 2014 
Country Rank 
(Scale) Country Score 2014  Score 2013  Score 2012  
5 Norway 86 86 85 
100 China 36 40 39 
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CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
THE RESEARCH  
 
The theoretical framework consists of three main theories that will address various 
perspectives on trust: Hofstede´s theory, governance theory and institutional theory. 
 
First, we start with Hofstede´s cultural dimensions to understand the main differences 
between Chinese and Norwegian culture and values, and how it influence how trust is 
perceived. Further governance theory is used to give a detailed explanation of rule-
based and relations based societies by Li (2009), to understand the perceptions of trust 
in different societies. Then, the institutional theory will be used to understand China´s 
shift from relation-based to a rule-based system, which the governance theory and 
Hofstede´s theory do not comprehend. At the end of the Chapter, the combined 
theoretical framework for our research is presented.  
 
3.1 Hofstede´s cultural dimensions: China vs. Norway 
Cultures foundation and developments are intangible concepts and therefore need 
comprehensive work to fully comprehend. To understand the main differences between 
China and Norway’s culture, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are described below.   
	  
Geert Hofstede provides one of the more convenient models; national culture 
dimensions, which focuses on the difference between cultures. Hofstede (2001) 
defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from another” (Hofstede 2001: 9).  
 
• Power distance (PDI): Power distance describes the acceptance of unequal power 
distribution, the degree of equality, or inequality between people in the society 
(Hofstede et al., 2010). Inequality can occur in several areas, such as physical or 
mental characteristics, social status and prestige, wealth, power, and privileges 
(Hofstede, 1980).  
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The Chinese culture is considered as high power distance, which has a high tolerance 
for inequalities among its members. The relationship between subordinate and superior 
tends to indicate a strong sense of vertical order and a strict hierarchical system. The 
Chinese society acknowledges hierarchical order, thus justification for people´s role 
and place is not needed (Hofstede et al., 2010).  
 
In contrast, the Norwegian culture is characterized as low power distance, where the 
power is decentralized and flat bodied. The interaction between the manager and the 
employee can be categorized as common, which means that involvement in decisions 
is valued. The Norwegian culture focuses on equality rights, expects people to be 
independent, make their own decisions and to be autonomous (e.g. at work) (Hofstede, 
1980). 
 
o Individualism (IDV) vs. Collectivism (COL): Individualism as opposed to 
collectivism describes group loyalty, and to what extent that culture supports 
individual or collective achievements and interpersonal relationships (Hofstede, 
1991). Individualism is described in term of “I” focusing on taking care of 
themselves and their immediate families. Collectivism characterized as close 
community where individuals expect exchange from their families or partners 
(Hofstede, 1980). Simply put, it is how people´s self-image is defined in terms of 
“we” or  “I” (Itim International, 2007).  
 
The Chinese culture is described as a collectivist society, which means that the 
importance of strong group relations are stressed, patriotism is the ideal and a group´s 
needs are put before the needs of the individuals (Hofstede et al., 2010). Individuals are 
born into extended families or other in-groups that provide protection in return for 
loyalty. Good personal relations are very important and necessary for being able to 
build trust (Hofstede, 2001). Relationships are considered as more important than 
rules; no matter what the rule say, it is important to protect family, friends or groups 
(Hofstede et al., 2010).  
 
In contrast, the Norwegian culture is considered an individualistic society, which 
means that “Self / I” is essential and personal opinions are respected. The citizens look 
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more after themselves and take responsibilities for their own actions (Hofstede, 1980). 
The interaction with citizens is open and clear, but at the same time privacy is 
respected. The relationships between stakeholders are based on contract/ written 
agreements, which means that they are applied to prevent misunderstandings and to 
solve problems.  
 
o Masculinity (MAS) vs. Femininity (FEM): A masculinity society is driven by 
competition, achievement and success, which are the main driving forces to being 
the “winner” or the “best”. Opposite is feminine society, which motivates and 
inspires people to do their best (Hofstede et al., 2010).  
 
Chinese culture´s dominant values are material success, competitiveness, ambitions, 
power, assertiveness and distinct gender roles (Hofstede, 2001). The Chinese are 
characterized as working to achieve the best results. Chinese “live to work” and 
sacrifice leisure time and family to achieve success, therefore being successful is the 
greatest motivation (Hofstede 1980).  
 
The Norwegian culture is known as a feminine society, which means that cooperation, 
friendly environment and employment security are important and valuable. Value 
orientation of gender roles is considered as equal; women and men are treated equally, 
resulting in lower gender discrimination. The decision-making between the citizens is 
through involvement and dialogs in groups/teams. In addition to work, Norwegians 
balance their work and social life and the leader supports and involves employees as 
well as focusing on thei wellbeing (Hofstede, 1980).  
 
o Uncertainty avoidance (UAI): Uncertainty avoidance is related to the degree to 
which one deals with uncertainty, and how many rules one needs to feel safe 
(Hofstede, 1991).  
 
Chinese societies have low uncertainty avoidance, hence they do not mind unstructured 
circumstances, are flexible to unstable environments and prefer fewer laws and rules. 
For the Chinese, uncertainty is a normal and an accepted feature of life (Hofstede, 
2010).  
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In contrast, the Norwegian culture is considered to be a moderate uncertainty 
avoidance one, which means that Norwegians citizens feel either uncomfortable or 
comfortable in unstructured situations (novel, unknown surprising and different from 
usual). Norwegians do not feel that the future has to be under control (Hofstede, 1980). 
 
o Long-term vs. Short- term orientation (LTO): Long-term vs. short-term 
orientation focuses on the degree the society embraces, or does not embrace, long-
term commitment to traditional, forward thinking values (Hofstede, 2001). 
 
The Chinese culture focuses on long-term orientation or pragmatism, thus fostering 
values concerning the future. More precisely, it gives importance to rewards, thriftiness 
and education and sees little value in leisure time. The Chinese believe that truth 
depends on the situation, context and time. Time requires achieving goals, building 
trust and good long-term relationships (Hofstede, 2010).  
 
Norwegian culture is characterized as a short-term oriented or normative, considering 
the present or past to be more important than the future. Norwegians prefer to maintain 
time-honored traditions and norms while viewing societal change with suspicion. 
Norwegians decision-making is made quickly and the focuses are on achieving fast 
results. This dimension reflects the general trust that citizens establish the absolute 
truth: Normative in their thinking (Hofstede, 1980). 
 
 
Figure 2: Hofstede's cultural dimensions: China vs. Norway. Adapted from source: 
Geert-hofstede.com, 2015 
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To summarize, a detailed comparison from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions between 
China and Norway is presented above (Figure 3). It is shown that these two countries 
represent very big cultural differences. In particular, China scores higher than Norway 
on Power Distance, Masculinity and Long-term Orientation. However, Norway scores 
higher on Individualism and slightly higher on Uncertainty Avoidance. This means that 
there is scope for trust challenges for Norwegian managers, as trust is perceived 
differently in these dimensions. In China trust is perceived by a long-term oriented 
process where relations must exist. This is in contradiction to how trust is perceived in 
Norway. Hofstede’s culture dimensions can be seen in connection to other theories that 
distinguishes China and western cultures trust differences.  	  
Trust can be understood differently between cultures, as many of the aspects of trust 
are perceived differently in the distinct cultures (Blanchard, 2010). According to 
Rousseau et al. (1990), understanding a culture might help the parties to overcome 
barriers and succeed. Thus, trust is an essential factor in the business process when two 
or more organizations/managers attempt to build strong and effective relationships. 
Several scholars (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; McAllister, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998) have 
spent years of studying the functions of trust in business, and that it is important to 
emphasize that no differences exist between how important trust is. Everyone, 
regardless of their cultural background, has a strong desire to develop relationships; 
hence trust is a crucial factor (Luo, 2007). Trust can be built or destroyed through 
personal perceptions and behaviors (Blanchard, 2010), or may be achieved through 
control. Hofstede (1991) regarding the dimension of Power Distance. The main 
differences between types of trust rely on how people from different societies work 
towards building a trusting relationship (Huang & Bond, 2012). Here, it is clearly 
recognized that trust, especially in China and the Western culture are completely 
different (Luo, 2007). 	  
As China is a relation-based society, trust is mostly built on relations (guanxi) and 
reciprocity, therefor people build trust before doing business (Schoorman et al., (2007). 
Morality is essential for considering trustworthiness (Huang & Bond, 2012). The 
Chinese business emphasizes personal trust, which exists between people from the 
same group (in the same guanxi); trust is therefore never presumed outside of it 
(Schoorman et al., (2007). By Hofstede´s culture dimensions (1991) it can be explained 
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through collectivist and individualist dimension. While trust in the Chinese society is 
highly time consuming, the level of trust can be achieved permanently (Huang & 
Bond, 2012). It can be supported by Hofstede´s culture dimensions´ categorization of 
China as long-term oriented (Hofstede, 1991). 
 
Western countries, including Norway, perceive trust in a different light. Trust is built 
on rules and contracts through social and legal systems (Luo, 2007). When the 
negotiations are completed, the agreement of both	  parties of signing contracts is the 
value of trust. Trust is therefore placed in the organization and not in individuals. 
Moreover, people in the Western societies feel more comfortable managing business 
and building trust at the same time (Mayer et al., 1995: 712). The Western managers 
stated that openness and reliability are the main factors of trustworthiness, but the 
degree of following proper rules and regulations are the main factor to gain trust in a 
business society.  
 
To summarize, it is clear that Chinese and Western cultures have two different 
perceptions of trust. Additionally, when doing business in China, building trust through 
relations is fairly necessary and appropriate while the Western culture relies more on 
people’s honesty and openness, as well as written agreements (Mayer et al., 1995). 	  
3.2 Governance theory 
Governance can be used in many contexts, such as national governance, international 
governance and corporate governance. The concept of governance can be explained in 
many ways, for this research a more convenient explanation by OECD (2003:6) that 
can be applied on corporate governance is shared: 
 
“Governance comprises a country´s private and public institutions, both formal and 
informal, which together govern the relationship between the people who manage 
corporations and all others who invest resources in corporations in the country. These 
institutions notably include the country´s corporate laws, security laws, accounting 
rules, generally accepted business practices and prevailing business ethics.” 
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The explanation of the concept shows the connection between a national governance 
and corporate governance. The sum of a country´s laws that are implemented and 
monitored by the government include corporate laws, security laws, accounting rules, 
generally accepted business practices and prevailing business ethics. Therefore, the 
national governance have an impact on corporate governance. However, there are 
mainly two different types of governance systems; relation-based and rule-based 
governance systems.   
 
3.2.1 Relation-based versus rule-based societies	  
There are two main different systems, which form the core scientific models of the 
Chinese and Western cultural society: Relation- based and rule- based society (Yang, 
1994; Guthrie, 1998; Li, 2004). In a society where the rule-based environment exist, 
the laws are made in a transparent and fair process, the courts enforce them fairly and 
efficiently, the judges are honest and impartial, and organizations and individuals tend 
to rely on the public rules to solve disputes and protect their interests (Li, 2013). In 
rule-based societies trusting formal contracts is valid in organizations. The 
commitments to colleagues, managers, employees and customers are predictable, 
which means that if someone does not like the terms, there are few barriers to leave the 
organization or partnerships as long as this does not violate the contracts (Li, 2009). To 
the extent that Western societies are rule-based, actors such as suppliers or partners do 
no need to pay attention as long as they follow their contractual agreements. The 
benefits of rule-base society are e.g. low entry- or exit barriers for partners or suppliers 
in business (Li, 2013). 
 
In contrast to rule–based societies, there is little academic study on relation-based 
societies and their impact on the businesses (Li, 2009). Therefore relation-based 
societies can be understood by comparing it with rule-based societies. When 
generalizing, the East typically tends to use personal relations to govern business 
transactions; hence relation-based societies characterize Asian societies (Li, 2009).  
 
In contrast to rule-based societies that are based on formal contracts legitimated by the 
government, relation-based societies are based on personal and implicit agreements 
that a third party cannot verify (Li, 2003). In developing countries, governance by 
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public rules and information disclosed by publicly listed companies are fragile, 
inefficient and regarded as untrustworthy; hence, relations are the basic mechanism to 
protect socioeconomic exchanges and interests (Li, 2009). A more detailed Table of 
differences between relation-based and rule-based societies is presented below (Table 
3).  
 
 
Table 3 Differences between relation-based and rule-based societies 
 
 
In general, Western societies base their laws and enforcement practices on the 
assumption of rules and contracts (rule-based societies), while East Asian countries are 
more inclined towards relationship-based societies (Li, 2009; Lau and Young, 2013). 
There are no countries that are purely rule-based or purely relation-based, but rather 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RELATION-BASED AND RULE-BASED 
SOCIETIES 
RELATION-BASED SOCIETIES RULE-BASED SOCIETIES 
-Relying on private and local information 
-Complete enforcement possible 
-Implicit and non-verifiable agreements 
-Person-specific and non-transferable 
contracts 
-High entry and exit barriers 
-Requiring minimum social order 
- Low fixed costs to set up the system 
- High and increasing marginal costs to 
maintain 
- Effective in small and emerging 
economies 
-Relying on public information 
-Enforcing a subset of observable 
agreements 
-Explicit and third-party verifiable 
agreements 
-Public and transferable contracts 
-Low entry and exit barriers 
-Requiring well-developed legal 
infrastructure 
- High fixed costs to set up the system. 
- Low and decreasing marginal costs to 
maintain 
- Effective in large and advanced 
economies 
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more of one than the other. This makes it difficult to distinguish countries on the basis 
of their governance system, as there are countries that are midway between these two. 
However, theory does not say much about a society where a combination of these two 
governance system exist, and only take into account that either one if it is more of a 
rule-based or more of relation-based society. 
 
To find out which countries that are more rule-based than others, Li (2009) conducted 
a survey where five governance-related indicators were measured. These are as 
follows: political rights, rule of law, free flow of information, quality of accounting 
standards, and public trust (Li, 2009).  
 
Li (2009) explained that the simplest method to categorize the countries is to divide 
them into two groups: one with negative and one with positive Governance 
Environment Indicators (GEIs). The five indicators used in the study relate more on 
rule-based governance environment, than relation-based environment, which mean that 
the higher the degree of the five indicators, the higher degree of rule-based governance 
in a country.  
 
Results (Table 4) show that Iran is ranked as the least rule-based country, followed by 
China (-5,92), while Western countries like Finland, Sweden and Netherlands are the 
most rule-based societies. This indicates that Scandinavian countries in general, 
including Norway, are the most rule-based countries (Li, 2009). 
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3.2.2 Rule-based vs. relation-based trust 
There exist many definitions of trust (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998). 
More appealing definitions of trust in this context are from the Western scholars Mayer 
et al., (1995) and Rousseau et al. (1998): 
 
“Trust is the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to 
the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer et 
al., 1995: 712). 
 
Country GEI Country GEI
Finland 6,41 Taiwan -0,13
Sweden 6,18 Romania -0,63
Netherlands 5,7 Thailand -0,84
Germany 4,53 India -0,85
United Kingdom 4,35 Ukraine -0,86
Switzerland 4,34 Indonesia -1,1
New Zealand 4,04 Bulgaria -1,75
Hong Kong 4,02 Mali -1,81
Australia 3,73 Peru -1,92
South Africa 3,11 Brazil -2,06
United States 2,3 Zambia -2,64
Cyprus 2,28 Turkey -2,75
Slovenia 2,23 Argentina -2,75
France 1,97 Malaysia -2,91
Japan 1,79 Egypt -3,04
Poland 1,32 Moldova -3,43
Spain 1,18 Colombia -3,69
Ghana 0,95 Morocco -3,7
Italy 0,94 Mexico -3,71
South Korea 0,24 Russia -4,34
Trinidad & Tobago 0,12 Vietnam -5,19
Chile 0,12 China -5,92
Iran -8,13
Table 4 Governance Environment Indicators (GEIs) by 
country. Source: Li, 2009, p.21 
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“Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau et al., 
1998: 395). 
 
The definitions emphasize that trust is when the trustor has a positive expectation on a 
particular action or performance from the trustee without the trustor monitoring the 
trustee´s performance. This puts them in a vulnerability state, because of the uncertain 
outcome. These two definitions can be applied in both the Chinese and Western 
context, because the definition of trust are not different in the West from China, but the 
difference is rather where the trust is placed and how much trust is needed. In 
generalized trust the trustor has positive expectations from the system, while in the 
particularized trust, the trustor has a positive expectations from the relations. In both 
particularized and generalized trust the trustor is put in a vulnerable state. 
 
However, there are dissimilarities when reviewing trust in the literature of Western and 
Chinese culture (Schoorman et al., 2007). Li (2009) divided the differences between 
trust in a rule-based and relation-based societies in terms of Generalized and 
Particularized trust. 
 
The generalized trust is when people trust the public, including strangers. A society 
with a high level of generalized trust relies on public laws and trusts information given 
publicly, thus no personal relation is needed to be established in order to get reliable 
information. In contrast, people that have little confidence or faith in strangers rely on 
people they know well (family or close friends) and thus have particularized trust.  
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Figure 3: Trust and rule of law, Source: World, value survey (2005), Gwartney and 
Lawson (2002) 
 
The Figure 3 above demonstrates the connection between degree of rule of law and the 
percentage of people who trust others (Li, 2009). It shows that people trust others more 
in a countries with a high degree of rule of law, Western societies, and less in countries 
with low degree of rule of law, e.g. Chinese society (Li, 2009). This explains that in 
rule-based societies, where the rule of law is high, there is more generalized trust i.e. 
people trust others more. While in relation-based societies, where there is a low rule of 
law, trusting other people is rare, especially those with whom you do not have a 
relation to e.g. a particularized trust.  	  
3.3 Institutional theory 
3.3.1. Introduction 
Institutional theory involves a broader and stronger understanding of social structure 
and considers normative, regulative and cognitive aspects to explain social behaviour 
(Scott, 2008).  Institutional theory will be one of the main theoretical “lenses” used for 
this study, especially to analyse the findings and to build the discussion.  
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This theory was developed as a criticism of traditional contingency theory that 
considers organizations as rational actors influenced by their technical-economic 
environments (Scott, 1995; 2008; Greenwood et al., 2008; Mineev, 2010). Overtime, 
organizations were not only seen as production systems, but also social and cultural 
systems. Even though there are no universal agreements on a single definition of 
institutions, the institutions concept defined by most of the scholars consists of 
regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive structures (Scott, 2008; North, 1990; 
Jansson et al., 2007; Campell; 2004). It examines the formation, adaptation, adaption 
and diffusion of these components over time. The cognitive institution is the shared 
ideas and perception that compose the nature of social reality and their meaning (Scott, 
2001). It specifies cause-and-effect relationship (Campbell, 2004). The normative 
institution involves values, norms, attitude and identities (Campbell, 2004). The 
regulative institution consists of rule setting, monitoring and sanctioning activities 
(Scott, 2001: 52). Different institutional components are shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Regulative, normative and cognitive elements associated with organizational 
change. Source: Palthel, J. 2014, p. 61 
 Regulative Normative Cognitive 
Legitimacy Legal systems Moral and ethical 
systems 
Cultural systems 
Central 
Rudiments 
Policies and rules Work roles, habits 
and norms 
Values, beliefs and 
assumptions 
System Change 
Drivers 
Legal obligation Moral obligation Change values are 
internalized 
System Change 
sustainers 
Fear and coercion Duty and 
responsibility 
Social identity and 
personal desire 
Behavioral 
Reasoning 
Have to Ought to Want to 
 
The difference or similarities between the regulative, cognitive and normative 
institutions of two countries is defined as institutional distance (Kostova and Roth, 
2003). To recognize and measure institutional distance between countries, one has to 
compare their institutional profile i.e. the cognitive, regulative and normative 
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components. However, when these components change in an environment, it is 
considered as institutional change (Kostova and Roth, 2002).  
 
Exogenous conditions impact organizations. Institutionalization and institutionalized is 
defined by Meyer and Rowan (1997). The process is defined as “social processes, 
obligations or actualities come to take on a rule-like status in a social thought and 
action” (Meyer and Rowan, 1997:341). It can be understood by something that is 
institutionalized is recognized over time (historicity) and is commonly shared. There 
are mainly three signs of institutionalized practices: they are widely followed, without 
debate, and exhibit permanence (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983: 25). This institutionalized 
concepts develops institutional pressures on organizations.  
 
Institutional theories of organizations claims that organizations adapt to both technical 
pressures as well as pressure from what they believe is expected from them, which 
leads to institutional isomorphism (Meyer and Rowan, 1997). Institutional 
isomorphism is explained by Dimaggio and Powell (1983) as a result of the 
competitive pressures that forces organizations to adopt a structure that is more fitting 
to their survival. Institutionalized isomorphism can mainly be divided into three forms. 
Coercive isomorphism occurs when organizations submitted to external pressures, due 
to cultural expectations or pressure from other organizations whom they are depend to. 
Normative isomorphism, as coercieve isomorphism is forced by external pressure. 
However, here the professional networks are the influencing source. Mimetic 
isomorphism, in contrast to the two other ones, occurs when organizations are 
uncertain, and thus display mimetic behavior when adopting other organizations 
structure. (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) 
 
3.3.2 Institutional change  
Globalization and the increase of international trade have resulted in institutional 
environment changing more swiftly (Jansson et al., 2007); hence institutional change is 
a widely used term within the institutional theory in recent times (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; Dimaggio and Powell, 1991; Newman, 2000). More recent work pays attention 
to social processes and explains how both individuals and organizations innovate and 
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contribute to institutional change. However, there has been limited understanding of 
institutional change, because of the excessive role of individual actors and ignorance of 
broader institutional contexts (Lounsbury and Crumley, 2007; Mineev, 2010). Even 
though, institutional scholars stress the importance of social life, there are some 
contradicting features. The relationship between institutional and organizational 
change is applied differently in studies of organization fields, although according to 
Scott (2008) it is the most significant concentration of institutional theory, yet the least 
familiar.  
 
There are mainly three different views to handle the institutional and organization 
change in the neo-institutional literature; unplanned interactive process, purposeful 
strategic action or adaption of the institutional environment (Scott, 1981; Mineev, 
2010). In this study the focus will be on the latter view.  
 
The theoretical position on this view is that the change can be explained by how 
institutions have a stabilizing effect on organizations (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991). If 
the institutional pressure is high, the organizations tend to develop formal structures 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It can be claimed that the institutional environment of 
organizations (context) play a key role (Scott, 2008). Institutionalization is the process 
by which “social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule-like status 
in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Therefore the key concept 
here is to pay attention to the institutional context, its development and impacts on 
organizational change. Today´s knowledge of interplay between institutional and 
organizational change has some blind spots. The context-driven perspective explains 
the origin and change occurring in institutions (the macro-level) (Mineev, 2010), 
therefore this thesis will attempt to throw light on this topic, by looking at how changes 
occurring in China challenge Norwegian managers´ trust relations.  	  
 
The main ingredients of the transition process (IMF, 2000) are: liberalization, 
macroeconomic stabilisation, restricting and privatization, and legal and institutional 
reforms.  
 
	   31	  
-­‐ Liberalization is the process of allowing most prices to be determined in free 
markets and lowering trade barriers that increase contact with the price 
structure of the world’s economy.  
 -­‐ Macroeconomic stabilization is primarily the process through which inflation is 
brought under control and lowered over time, after the initial burst of high 
inflation that follows liberalization and the easing of the demand. This requires 
discipline in the government budget and the growth of money and credit i.e. 
discipline in fiscal and monetary policy, and progress towards a sustainable 
balance of payments.  
 -­‐ Restructuring and privatization is another key factor, which is the process of 
creating a viable financial sector. This means reforming the enterprises in these 
economies to make them capable of producing goods that could be sold in free 
markets and of transferring their ownership into private hands.  
 -­‐ The last transition process is legal and institutional reforms which redefine the 
role of the state in these economies, establish the rule of law and introduce 
appropriate competition policies” (IMF, 2000). 
 
These components can be understood by how a country´s transition process indirectly 
relates to how rule-based a country is. All these components are dependent on a 
country´s governance system, particularly whether it is based on rules rather than 
relations. For example is the liberalization process dependent on businesses following 
certain rules, especially in international trades. The rules are set and monitored closely 
by the WTO. The system is transparent and highly sensitive to corruption. Similarly, 
macroeconomic stabilization requires disciplines, thus it is evident that certain rules 
and regulations have to be followed at a higher level in the country. The point here is 
to highlight that the main ingredients for transition process are highly dependent on a 
system that is transparent, trustworthy and reliable. 
 
Institutional imperfection is “the gap between the existing and the desired institutional 
arrangements and governance systems. It is the degree to which institutions (e.g., 
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structures, practices, legitimating actors) are not well defined and established as well as 
the inconsistency between these institutions”(Kostova and Roth, 2003: 315).  
 
The transition process from a relation-based governance system to a rule-based 
governance system can be understood as institutional imperfection. The existing 
institutional arrangements and governance systems in transition economies are more 
relation-based and the desired one is more a rule-based. However, it may also be that 
during the transition period the old institution may have a stronger grip, while the new 
one is not yet established. This gap between the existing and desired one determines 
whether the transition process will go fast or slow. The bigger the gap, the more 
imperfection increases and the more insecure the members get about what values, 
structures, principles and practices to follow (Kostova and Roth, 2003). The transition 
from relation-based governance to rule-based governance make the members insecure 
about where rules are to be followed, where and how much to rely and trust the 
government, and how much to still rely on relations.  
 
Times of transitions are characterized by serious institutional imperfection, which is 
reduced over time as a result of development of the desired state (Kostova and Roth, 
2003). How difficult the transition and the progress of the transition can be is 
determined by how much the prior institutional environment is embedded in the 
society, i.e. the intuitional baggage (Kostova and Roth, 2003). Establishing new 
institutional arrangements is tough when the institutional baggage is high (North, 
1990). North (1990) points out that the formal rules can change overnight by political 
and judicial decisions, but the informal restrictions such as traditions, codes and norms 
are more impermeable to change and to execute policies. Even though the members 
acknowledge the need for change, it may be difficult as they will be powerless due to 
the high institutional baggage (Kostova and Roth 2003). During institutional change, 
ceremonial changes may occur, when new rules and regulations are implemented, but 
are not followed in practice. These ceremonial changes occur due to the pressure to 
establish legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). 
 
Institutional upheaval is characterized as the changes in corporate governance system 
(central planning to market economy), which Kostova and Roth (2003) emphasize as a 
transition economy. Newman (2000) defines institutional upheaval as “a rapid and 
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pervasive change in the norms and values that underlie and legitimate economic 
activity, which results in fundamental change in a society’s political system, its legal 
and regulatory frameworks, its economic system and its financial infrastructure” 
(Newman, 2000: 603). 
 
Berger and Luckman (1996) argued that organizations becoming isomorphic caused 
institutional decoupling. Institutional decoupling is commonly understood as a gap 
between actions and structure (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). There are mainly two forms 
of decoupling: Policy-practice and Means-ends.  
 
Policy-practice develops when rules are not fully implemented and continuously 
followed and violated constantly, thus there is a gap between policy and practice 
(Tolbert and Zucker, 2012).  Policy- practice decoupling occurs due to implementation 
of policies that are inefficient policies for the core activities. Means-ends decoupling 
occurs when there is a gap between means and ends. It contains a relationship between 
organizations goals and contradicting policies. Organizations have to decouple because 
rules and policies that are implemented, do not assurance organizations outcome. Thus, 
formal structures can said to have real organizational consequence (Tolbert and 
Zucker, 2012). 
3.3.3 Institutional trust 
There is a connection between how trust is perceived in a governance system and how 
trust is perceived in the business environment. In China with a relation-based 
governance system, the business world has always been done through guanxi i.e. 
norms and values, because the system has not been optimal and stable and therefore it 
has been the only option. However, in Norway, with a rule-based governance system, 
business is done relying on the system, in other words institutional trust.  
 
Institutions are relatively stable sets of rules generally accepted and followed, and can 
be divided into formal and informal dimensions (North, 1990). The formal dimension 
includes political rules, judicial decisions and economic contracts. The informal 
constraints include socially sanctioned norms of behavior, which are embedded in 
cultural values and ideology (Scott, 1995). Levi (1996) argues that “governments 
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provide more than the backdrop for facilitating trust among citizens; governments also 
influence civic behavior to the extent that they elicit trust or distrust towards 
themselves” (Levi, 1996: 51). Farrell and Knight (2003) argue that institutions foster 
trust, by creating rules, incentives and sanctions for people to behave in a trustworthy 
manner. By relying on and trusting the formal institutions, contracting parties channel 
each other´s behavior to a more predictable and acceptable manner. Thus, the greater 
and more reliable the formal institutions are the more predictable and stable trust in 
informal institutions is.  
 
It is clear that trust is an important factor in both rule-based and relation-based 
societies, but due to the difference in the institutional development in China and 
Norway, there is a difference where trust is placed. 
 
3.4 Building multiple theoretical framework  
 
There have been arguments about whether China will ever transfer from relation- 
based governance to rule-based governance. Some scholars have argued that China 
will not transfer due to its unique cultural heritage (Wang and Zheng, 2012; Lau and 
Yong, 2013). However, Li (2013) emphasizes that similar cultures to China (Taiwan 
and Hong Kong) have a governance system that is largely rule-based. Hence the 
culture argument does not hold up. He further argues that the transfer will take place, 
but when and how is not clear. Also there is need to analyse where China is on the 
curve of the shift from relation-based to rule-based governance system (Li, 2013). 
Therefore it is uncertain how far they currently have reached in their transition, and 
which may be causing challenges for foreign business managers.  
 
It should be made clear that unlike mathematics, the study of business culture is not 
very accurate. Generalizing cultures based on previous research, in both social and 
business context, cannot be 100 percent valid. Saying that all members of particular 
culture behave in certain way, would lead to them being stereotyped, and therefore 
should be dealt with carefully. However, it is worth mentioning that it is very difficult 
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to not fall into this trap, and the reader should therefore bear this fact in mind at all 
times.  
 
At the same time, China is a huge country and to consider its environment and culture 
to be uniform in all regions would be misleading and give misconceptions about China. 
However, such details cannot be dealt with in a justified manner and is too extensive 
for a thesis like this.  	  
In this chapter China´s and Norway´s institutional environment can in comparison be 
considered to have a substantial institutional distance. However, it is interesting to see 
how previous challenges regarding institutional distance between Norway and China 
and how the current Chinese transition are causing additional challenges for 
Norwegian managers doing business in China. Thus to understand it is necessary to see 
it from the three different perspectives that the three alternatives theories provides.   
An important factor for China that is undergoing an institutional change is that 
Hofstede´s National Cultural Dimension, which is a static model, might not hold 
weight as it is based on the IBM (International Business Machines Corporation) study, 
which was done for more than 30 years ago. Hofstede (1991) states that it is a 
connection between a nation´s economy and some of the dimensions. There are 
countries that have developed, both industrially and economically, since the survey 
was conducted, therefore the economic growth can give possibility for Hofstede´s 
dimensions not reflecting the current situations in all countries, especially for transition 
countries. As it doesn´t look at the dynamic aspect. However, it can be used to 
described how work norms and behavior in a country is influenced by culture. As there 
is no other updated equally comprehended empirical studies done on national cultures, 
this study will use Hofstede´s culture dimensions. It will help to give a clear picture of 
what cultural values have strong roots in china and thus still exists today, and what 
values that have changed due to the transitions. Additionally, it will help to understand 
and explain the identified challenges Norwegian managers might be facing, due to 
cultural differences.   
 
However, governance theory will provide a different perspective then Hofstede. It can 
help to see the shift from relation-based, where China has been, to a rule-based 
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governance system, where they are headed. Intuitional theory will fill the gap in 
between this shift, which neither Hofstede´s culture dimensions and governance theory 
provides. As institutional theory involves understanding of social behavior from social 
structure and considers all the three normative, regulative and cognitive aspects, it give 
the study an overview from another perspective.   
Combing these multiple theoretical perspectives will provide a clear picture of the 
challenges Norwegian managers face. Additionally, it will show a connection between 
trust challenges and China’s transition.  
Below is a theoretical framework, which shows a model of how institutional pressure 
influences Norwegian managers due to China’s transition. The theoretical framework 
summarizes and gives a better understanding of the Governance Theory, Institutional 
Theory and Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions (Figure 4). As there is a gap in the 
literature and research, these theories are used as a foundation to build the theoretical 
framework to better understand the thesis phenomena, rather than comparing it with 
past and similar research.  
The model illustrates that there is a connection between China´s past (traditional 
economy), present (transition economy) and future (market-based economy).  
There is a theoretical gap on the phase in between rule-based and relation-based 
governance system (Li, 2009), therefore it is interesting to understand how much of the 
prior environment that was based on cognitive and normative aspects still influences 
and is based on the present transition economy, and how much of the market-based 
economy that is based on rules and laws influences the present transition economy.  
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Figure 4: Theoretical framework. Developed by the authors 	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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHOD   
This chapter presents approaches that have been chosen in this study. The purpose of 
the research method is to undertake a valid study in order to answer the research 
question in the most effective and reliable manner (Saunders et al., 2012). Trust 
relations are complex concepts and to answer the research question in the best way a 
well-considered and reflective research process, that has detailed explanation of the 
choices made, is significant. 
4.1 Research philosophy  
The foundation for the choice of the research design is based on which philosophies 
one follows (Saunders et al., 2012). There are mainly two main contrasting ways to 
look at the nature of the world and how to inquire into the nature of the world; 
positivist position and social constructionist position (Saunders et al., 2012). From a 
positivist position the social world exists externally and assumes that reality is external 
and objective, thus its properties should be measured through objective methods. In 
contrast, a social constructionist position does not assume the reality to be external or 
objective, but rather found between individuals.  
 
This thesis topic is best suited to be inquired from a social constructionist position, as 
the concept of trust and management challenges due to transition economies can only 
be understood by people. The assumption of the world is not based on a single reality 
that can somehow be discovered, but rather many perspectives on the issue: individual 
interpretation of interviews is required, where research progress is done through 
gathering rich data from which ideas are induced, and not statistical analysis (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2012). It is especially important as China is a transition economy, thus 
managers´ thinking would also understandably change over time.  
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4.2 Research design  
As this thesis aims at exploring and understanding the trust challenges Norwegian 
managers face because of transition economies, applying qualitative methodology is 
most appropriate.  
Trust is a complex concept and a qualitative method suits this research in a social and 
cultural context. The research question is believed to involve individual and contextual 
interpretations of reality, and adds to this choice of method. Kvale (2004) argues that 
the qualitative approach’s strength is that it captures the variation in the informants' 
perceptions about a subject, thus giving a picture of a diverse human world. Jacobsen 
(2000) argues that this type of research emphasizes that the phenomenon must be 
understood as a complex interaction between individuals and the particular context in 
which they are a part of.  
 
When choosing a qualitative method, understanding and interpreting informants´ 
information is important. Additionally, going deeper into the context to understand 
how and why, the qualitative research establishes trust, access to meanings and give in-
depth understanding of the phenomenon (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
As mentioned above, contextualizing the individuals´ interpretation gives this thesis a 
more holistic social constructivist approach, rather than individualist, positivist 
approach (Saunders et al., 2012). To understand the chosen phenomenon, the 
individual and the world cannot be separated. This means the phenomenon can be 
understood from the individuals´ culture and environment in which they live and 
construct knowledge from, i.e. from a holistic, hermeneutic approach (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011). It will be difficult to find an objective, quantifiable truth when studying 
the challenges facing Norwegian managers. This thesis is therefore inspired by the 
hermeneutic point of view (figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Hermeneutics circle applied in this study, customized by the authors, 2015 	  
Figure 5 shows a detailed explanation of the hermeneutic circle that starts with a pre-
understanding of the research area. The entire process started at the beginning of 
January 2015 where we showed a great interest in China and a numbers of articles 
(stage 2): among others, “China’s (Painful) Transition from Relation-Based to Rule-
Based Governance” (Li, 2013), ”How to succeed in China”	  (Cao,	  2014), “China is still 
critical to Norway” (Bakken, 2011) and ”Business in China means relations” (Farbrot, 
2014).  
Without any prior knowledge about China, the researchers wanted to gain a deeper 
understanding and contacted various researchers/scholars to hear about their business 
experiences in China, thus pre-interviews were conducted (stage 3). The following two 
questions were asked:  
 
1. What are the biggest challenges for Norwegian managers in China? 
2. What are the main cultural differences in Norway compared to China? 
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Understandably, there were several challenges highlighted due to cultural differences, 
such as communication, language, trust and relationship-building. Although, all of 
these topics are very interesting, it was not possible to research them all, due to time 
constraints. As we discussed back and forth, the perception of trust was chosen, as 
there is limited research available particularly from a Norwegian management 
perspective due to China’s transition from a relation-based to a rule-based society. 
 
Pre-interviewees recommended sources as well as articles, which allowed us to greater 
conceptualize what was being studied and led to us to seeking to understand more 
about it. However, as stated little research has been done about precisely this chosen 
research question, so exploring the field to gain more knowledge was needed. Through 
studying theories and literature about different governance systems and national 
cultures, some grounds was covered, though to a relatively basis level. The phenomena 
will be explored on the bases of preliminary understanding of the subject, and we will 
continue exploring the subject together with the informants, gaining new and better 
knowledge about the research question (stage 4).  
 
This paper attempts to lay the groundwork for future research; hence an exploratory 
research was the most suitable design for this paper as the research aims to seek new 
insight into phenomena, to ask questions, and to assess the phenomenon in a new light 
(Saunders et al., 2012).  
4.3 Case study 
For the purpose of the current research, the study focuses on studying Norwegian 
managers’ trust challenges in the context of China. The reason for choosing China as a 
case study is to understand why the globalization concept is not working, hence the 
need for a context where tension is expected. In this regard Norway and China are not 
only geographically distant, but also historically, politically and culturally. 
Consequently, this case study has focused on China’s transition from a relation-based 
to a rule-based society in which Norwegian managers can be considered as rule-
followers or relationship-builders. 
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As mentioned earlier, there already exists a general theory about Chinese governance, 
culture and their relationship to trust, hence there already exists a general conceptual 
framework for this study. However, since there is little research on trust in transition 
economies, particularly in China, and managers’ challenges in relations to that, this 
thesis starts on “little” theory and conducts data gathering with the purpose of 
establishing a new theory as well as modifying existing theories based on our findings.  
 
This thesis is also inspired by the induction approach that involves the development of 
a theory as a result of the observation of empirical data. Therefore, this research is an 
abduction approach, which moves back and forth, in effect combining the deduction 
and induction approaches (Saunders et al., 2012). 	  
There are several conceivable methods to use in qualitative studies with exploratory 
research design and an abduction approach (Saunders et al., 2012). However, a case 
study is the most suitable method for this thesis as this approach opens up new areas, 
of focus, i.e. Norwegian managers’ in China, and develops new understanding of the 
phenomenon of China’s transition.  
 
A case study can be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). 
 
The definition clearly specifies why this approach is best suited for this research. There 
is an empirical inquiry that investigates Norwegian managers’ current situation in 
China. There are mainly two types of cases, a single and multiple case designs. 
However, there are in general four types of design, which are shown below (figure 6) 
(Yin, 2003).  
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Figure 6: Basic types of designs for case studies, adapted from source: Yin, 2003. p. 40 
 
As we want to study a tension area in transition economies, choosing China as a single 
case is based on economic, cultural, geographical and demographical reasons. Thus it 
is no room for studying multiple-case design that may include other transition 
economies. This is because China is a huge country and the different regions in China 
itself comprise and can be considered as a “country”. Additionally, the timeframe of 
this study best suits a single case study, to have a deeper understanding and to not have 
a superficial research. The advantage of choosing Norwegian managers, as a single-
unit of this study in addition to the possible tension area that exist between China and 
Norway, there is little existing empirical research on Norwegian managers in China. 
However, our cultural background and understanding of the Norwegian and Chinese 
culture would not only benefit us, but the research to. The research ask a “How” 
question, and thus a single-case design with a single-unit would be the best to answer a 
“How” question. The situation can therefore not be manipulated as well as it is not 
possible to measure effects in a laboratory.  
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The multiple case methods would have been suitable if more than one country had to 
be analysed or if the focus would be on the difference between companies, their 
background and industry. According to Flyvbjerg (2006), multiple case designs are 
often considered more compelling and their answers/information more robust. Multiple 
cases have proven to be rated higher in terms of overall quality than single case studies 
because they increase the chances of a good case study (Flyvbjerg, 2006). However, 
due to time constraints, this was not possible. 
 
To summarize, this research undertakes (1) to answer the “how?” question; (2) 
manipulation of the informants cannot be done and it is not possible to measure effects 
in a laboratory or by manipulating the environment; and (3) contextual conditions are 
relevant to the phenomena (Yin, 2003). Because all these conditions are met in this 
thesis, a single case study with multiple units was chosen. 
 
4.4 Data collection and analysis 
Collecting and sorting data is one of the main tasks when working with a case study as 
the quality of this thesis is dependent on the quality of the information and data 
collected (Saunders et al., 2009). The data can be drawn into two categories: primary 
and secondary data, however the focus have been on primary data.  
4.4.1 Sampling  
Primary data is data collected precisely for the research project being undertaken, 
which is not publicly known (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). Access to primary data 
information is crucial in order to conduct a reliable analysis. In this thesis primary data 
is needed, as there has been no prior research conducted in this particular area and 
would therefore be most capable of answering the research question. Therefore, the 
qualitative method in both highly and semi-structured interviews with Norwegian 
managers working in China provided us with valuable insight.  
 
As mentioned, Norwegian managers were chosen as subunits and can be explained as 
the population in this case study. A population refers to all the members of the group 
the subject relates to (Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). In general, it is impossible to study 
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the whole population, because it is time consuming, expensive and simply difficult to 
reach out to the whole population (all the Norwegian managers in China): a sample of 
few criteria’s had to be sufficient. 
 
In mid-March, we undertook a systematic random sampling based on a list on the 
Norwegian Embassy in China and Innovation Norway´s web page. In total there were 
212 Norwegian companies, where 95 of the companies are located in Shanghai and 
Beijing (detailed list in appendix 6). Due to time constraints, we contacted 50 different 
companies through contact informant available on their websites, independent of the 
specific industry. This was because we wanted a holistic perspective from managers in 
various industries/sectors.  
 
For the purpose of this research, we established four criteria that had to be fulfilled:  
 
1. Norwegian middle or top levels managers that currently work in China. 
The reason for focusing on middle and top-level managers was because we 
wanted to find out how China’s environment challenge Norwegian companies. 
Therefore, it is logical that managers are the ones first and foremost affected 
first changes in the macro environment. Additionally, they are the decision 
makers and implementers for all internal changes in organizations. Moreover, 
big cities such as Shanghai and Beijing were chosen because of the vast culture 
difference in China. The largest differences are between the big cities and the 
small cities. 
 
2. The manager should have more than two years experience in China as well as 
experience in Norway. This was because of their ability to make a qualified 
comparison as well as being able to compare personal experiences from both 
countries. 
 
3. The manager should have Chinese external stakeholders to ensure that 
Norwegian managers meet the Chinese business culture up-close, as the 
external Chinese stakeholders are shaped by the work life in China and not by 
foreign owners. 
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4. 50/50 gender balance. The researchers want to have a gender balance in order 
to get information from different viewpoints.  
 
In total, 50 (25 males and 25 females) qualified top-level and middle managers of 95 
Norwegian companies located in Shanghai and Beijing were contacted via e-mail in 
the middle of March. A detailed description of the researchers, topic and the timeframe 
were added in the e-mail in order to get the manager’s attention and interest, and to 
schedule the interviews fairly early. Of the 50 managers that were contacted, only 7 
managers (4 males and 3 females) gave a positive response.  
 
Below is a short description of the seven informants (Table 5):  
 
Table 5 Description of the seven informants, created by the authors, 2015 
 
Informant Title Gender Years in 
business 
Industry City Company 
size 
1 Project 
manager 
Male 9 Transport Beijing Large 
2 Founder & 
managing 
director 
Male 8 Energy Beijing Large 
3 Top & 
Academic 
manager 
Female 10 Education Shanghai Small 
4 Founder and 
managing 
director 
Male 3 Consultancy Shanghai Micro 
5 Executive 
Vice President 
Male 3 Finance and 
bank 
Shanghai Medium 
6 Founder & 
managing 
director 
Female 4 Health-care Beijing Micro 
7 Top manager Female 4 Shipping Beijing Large 
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4.4.2 Primary data collection  
The qualitative interviews conducted in this thesis were both semi-structured and 
highly structured depending on whether the interviews were done face-to-face or 
through e-mail. Two of the interviews were done through e-mail, as the informants 
were in China and did not have time for a video-call through Skype. The interviews 
done conducted via e-mail were highly- structured (Appendix 1), as structured 
interviews give more concrete information, and was the better approach as we were 
unable to ask additional questions and use laddering techniques. Laddering techniques 
are used to reveal and get a better understanding of the individuals’ value base 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2012). The disadvantage of highly structured interviews sent 
through e-mail was that we could neither see nor hear the informants; hence we could 
not know whether what factors could be influencing the informant answers. However, 
the advantages of highly structured interviews are that the informants cannot talk away 
from the questions and the method is less time consuming as well as less expensive.  
 
Due to the Easter holidays, five of the informants had planned to travel to Norway, 
which provided us with an opportunity to conduct the interviews face-to-face in Oslo, 
Norway during the first week of April 2015. The advantages of face-to-face interviews 
are the open dialogue with the informant, as well as being able to ensure no or minimal 
influencing factors influencing during the interview, which can occur through 
Skype/Internet interviews. These interviews were semi-structured, guided open 
interviews with three main topics (appendix 2), and a laddering technique was used. 
“Why?” and “how?” questions were asked as well as additional examples to have a 
deeper understanding. Moreover, the interviewees ensured that there were monologues 
without interruptions. Sometimes, the researchers said, “that is interesting” and showed 
some emotional reactions such as smiles, in order to create a comfortable atmosphere.  
 
Both of the researchers were present under all the interviews. One led the interviews 
while the other observed and took notes. There was a good tone between the 
researchers and the informants during the interviews. The interviews started with a 
brief presentation of the subject of the thesis. Additionally, the interviews were 
recorded on both computer-software and a mobile phone, with the informants’ 
permission; to ensure that all the information was secure and to stay focused on the 
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informants. The interviews were conducted at the informants’ home, work place and at 
a café, all according to their preference so they could feel more comfortable.  
 
As all the informants are Norwegian, it was more practical to conduct the interviews in 
Norwegian and to later translate the interviews to English. The timeframe of the 
interviews was approximately 40-90 minutes, depending on the interviewees’ 
condition. The interview-guide and the research question were not given prior to the 
interviews because we wanted the informants to answer the questions based on their 
own experience rather than information that could have been found by other sources 
(Internet or other people). Each interview was transcribed word by word into Microsoft 
Word documents and analyzed immediately after they were conducted. 
4.4.3 Interview guide 
The questions in the interviews were formed on the basis of the theoretical framework 
(Figure 4). The questions were divided into three main topics:  
 
1) China´s culture, values and norms 
2) Trust in the government system 
3) China´s transition.  
 
The semi-structured interviews had three big open-ended questions while the highly 
structured interviews had additional guiding questions in order to ensure that all topics 
were covered. The quantity varied according to how deep an understanding of each 
topic was desired. See appendix 1 and 2 for the highly- and semi-structured interview 
guide.  
 
1. China´s culture, values and norms  
In order to understand how the Chinese culture will impact a Norwegian manager’s 
company and their position as a manager, it was essential to know how important the 
Chinese culture still is and which norms and values still exist in the Chinese business 
world today. The value of guanxi (relations), mianzi (face) and trust were considered to 
be especially relevant concepts to inquire about.  
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2. Trust in the government system 
Theoretically, there is an essential difference between China and Norway regarding 
where trust is placed in the business context. It is therefore important to know where 
Norwegian managers place their trust when they are in China; in the system or in 
relations. This information will also show how China´s transition phase can be 
understood.  
 
3. China´s transition  
Regarding the research question, it was important to know whether the Norwegian 
managers have observed any changes in the cultural, regulatory or/and normative 
aspects in China, and if this has an impact on their company or their position as a 
manager. Through this questions, we can more easily understand whether Norwegian 
managers face this “additional” challenge regarding China´s transition as well as which 
trust challenges that arise.  
 
4.5 Credibility of the research  
In order to increase the quality of the case study and overcome traditional criticisms of 
weakness, validity and reliability are discussed below (Yin, 2003).  
4.5.1 Validity 
Johannessen et al., (2011) described validity as how accurate the data collection 
resembles reality. This means how relevant and true it is for the phenomenon that is 
being studied. Yin (2003) classifies validity in three groups: Construct validity, internal 
validity, and external validity 
 
Construct validity is the relation between the data and the phenomenon that has been 
studied (Johannessen et al., 2011). This means that the data is a good representation of 
the overall phenomenon and if the authors could measure what they wanted to 
measure. Therefore, construct validity is necessary, enabling the research results to be 
meaningful and to be interpreted and transferred to other cases (Yin, 2003). 
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Throughout the interviews, the researchers focused on asking suitable questions in 
relation to the research question. As mentioned, the researchers used a semi-structured 
interview technique when conducting face-to-face interviews. This provided 
opportunities for changes, which made it possible to ask detailed and supplementary 
questions during the interviews. The researchers were constantly attentive to providing 
the informants the opportunity to talk openly as well to allow them to bring new 
themes that they considered important. When the researchers observed insecurity of 
informants, definitions and explanations were provided in order to ensure that the 
questions were clearly understood.  In this regard, Johannessen et al. (2011) explained 
that if the researchers were able to attain differences and broadness in the interview, 
thus specifying the findings, it would increase the validity of the results.  
 
Additionally, questions such as “Your experience” and “How does it affect you and 
your company?” were added in all questions in order to give the informant the 
opportunity to give their own examples. Moreover, this was also to ensure that the 
informants had understood the questions and that it corresponded to the topic that was 
being investigated. 
 
Lastly, at the end of the interview document the informants were asked about the 
possibility of contacting them further. This was to ensure that the researchers had a 
chance to contact the informant if there were any additional questions or uncertainty 
about the answers. 
 
To reduce the risk of ending up with poor validity, transcribing (semi-structured 
interviews) and analysing the information were done after each interview was 
conducted, in order to reflect whether the questions had to be more obvious to lead the 
questions more closely to the research question.  
 
Internal validity is the extent on a casual relation in which the changes in one variable 
affects on others (Yin, 2003). In a qualitative study internal validity is hard to measure 
(Yin, 2003).  However, Johannessen et al., (2011) explain credibility as an evaluation 
criterion in which the findings and results can be trustworthy, which better suits a 
qualitative method.  
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Questions during the interview were created in a way that the informants could bring 
their own experience. This was to better understand the informants’ answers. 
Additionally, the researchers chose to ask the same question twice in the semi-
structured interviews to make sure that the information had the same sense as the 
previous question. This was to investigate whether the researchers could trust the 
information. However, an assessment on their objective credibility was challenging, as 
their experience is subjective in nature.  
 
External validity is the extent to which the research can be generalized (Yin, 2003).  
It is difficult to generalize a qualitative study as each case study is unique and the 
research results cannot be directly applied in other case studies. Moreover, to 
generalize a case study for a whole population is challenging because in-depth 
interviews normally have a small sample size. As mentioned, 7 managers represent the 
research from 212 registered Norwegian companies in China. Since China is a large 
country and it is uncertain how many Norwegian managers there are in total, the 
authors argue that the chance of generalizing the data to an entire population would be 
difficult in this case. However, an analytical generalization can be done as similar 
theories from this study can be used in other contexts, which can be of value in 
studying other companies such as for managers from a rule-based society working in 
relation-based society (Flyvbjerg, 2006). 
 
4.5.2 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the extent to which the data collection technique procedures will 
yield consistent findings, similar observations or conclusions reached by other 
researchers (Saunders et al., 2012). Easterby-Smith et al. (2012) argue that the absolute 
replication of qualitative studies is very difficult to achieve since it reflects realities at 
the time they were collected and in a situation which is likely to change.   
 
For instant, a careful and systematic collection of data is vital in order to gain a high 
level of reliability in this research. In order to strengthen the reliability in this thesis, a 
number of measures were undertaken: all information during the interviews was 
recorded into three software devices to present more reliable evidence and avoid any 
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bias which might happen if the researchers attempted to remember the conversation.  
Moreover, three devices were used to ensure that all information was recorded and that 
we had an extra backup if a sound recorder would run out of battery or experience 
other technical difficulties. However, recording might influence the informants’ 
answers, as they became nervous at the beginning of the conversation. Nevertheless, it 
appears that the informants forgot the recorder after a short while as they spoke more 
openly and fluently. Additionally, all the questions were worded clearly and asked in a 
natural tone of voice in order to enable the informants to understand what the 
researchers was asking for. Moreover, all the informants were given the opportunity to 
explain their own experience and thoughts without any invention from the researcher, 
which would create a bias.    
 
Additionally, transcriptions were done right after the interview, as the information was 
still “fresh” (in mind). Further, to ensure that all the information during the interviews 
was correct, transcriptions were sent to all the informants in order to read through and 
adjust them if any misunderstanding had arisen between the researchers and the 
informant. Another important factor is the anonymity. The informants were assured 
anonymity, which might have enabled a more open dialogue with more honest 
answers, which strengthen the reliability of the data.  
 
Moreover, after five semi-structured interviews, the researchers saw that the same 
topics were repeated. To ensure the answers, the researchers conducted highly 
structured interviews via e-mail to the two remaining informants. The researchers 
recognized that the same topics were also mentioned, thus it can be concluded that the 
information from the interviews is reliable.  
 
Furthermore, to strengthen the credibility that is done through strengthening the 
validity and reliability of the research, triangulation strategy was used.  	  
A triangulation strategy can be explained as the combination of different methods, 
methodological perspective and/or theoretical viewpoints in the study (Guion et al., 
(2012). This means that it can reduce and eliminate personal and methodological biases 
and increase the probability of generalising the findings of a study, as the data is 
gathered from different angles and by different methods.  
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Guion et al., (2012) illustrated different types of triangulation strategies, however, this 
thesis used theory triangulations, methodology triangulation and investigator 
triangulation, which are discussed below: 
 
Theoretical triangulation draws upon alternative or competing theories in preference to 
utilising one viewpoint (Kimchi et al. 1991). Throughout the whole thesis, theoretical 
concepts have been used and discussed from different perspectives to better understand 
the trust concept, hence, Hofstede´s theory, governance theory and institutional theory.  
 
Methodological triangulation is the concept where different methodological 
approaches in a research have been used (Kimchi et al. 1991). This research use both 
primary and secondary data, where the secondary data has provided valuable 
information for the primary data. This strengthens the credibility of the research.  
 
Investigator triangulation is a process where two or more investigators work together 
in the same phenomenon (Kimchi et al. 1991). This study is developed by two 
researchers. The advantages of this is that “two heads are better than one” and produce 
more reliable results. By working together, understanding and interpreting the theory 
as well as analysing the empirical data from different perspectives increase the 
reliability of the findings. The use of investigator triangulation removes the potential 
for bias that may occur in a study conducted by one person. However, the 
disadvantages of using investigator triangulation methods is time consumption, as there 
are many opinions that have to be reflected upon, making it challenging to gather all 
information and theory into one thesis. 
 
4.6 Research ethics 
There are ethical principles and legal guidelines researchers should respect when 
conducting research (Johannessen et al. 2011). The National Research Ethics 
Committee for Social Sciences and Humanities (NESH) has adopted several ethical 
guidelines that researchers should consider. Some of the most important are: consent, 
confidentiality and trust (NESH, 2014). 
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During the interviews, it was important for informants to feel that their values and 
integrity was ensured. All seven informants were informed of the purpose of the 
research, identity, recording and the right to cancel at any time. The personal 
information of all participants was carefully protected through anonymising their 
names and not mentioning the company for whom they work.   
 
To provide the informants security, their transcriptions were sent to all the informants 
in order for them to be assured that the “right” information has been used.  
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CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS   
Interviews shape the primary empirical foundation of this study and are the basic part 
of the design of this study. This chapter contains the main findings of the research. 
Following qualitative study procedures, important quotes from the interviews are 
provided. All the interviews are translated from Norwegian to English.  
 
Each informant is mentioned as Interviewee 1-7 in order to protect his or her identity. 
We will present our data according to three perspectives, corresponding to our 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3. The two subsections in this Chapter 
comprise the sub-questions in Chapter 1.  
 
5.1 Trust in Chinese cultural norms and values 
It is clear that the Chinese culture has a huge impact on the business culture in China. 
That is why trust has always been an essential factor while doing business in China. 
Based on the interviews, all informants work actively to build trust with their internal 
and external members. To build trust the practice of relations (guanxi) i.e. norms and 
values is extremely important. All the informants, independently of the industry or 
work experience in China, clarified that it is impossible to do any kind of businesses, if 
relations (guanxi) are not established. As one of the interviewees put it: 
 
“Guanxi is absolutely central in the Chinese business culture today. I would 
say it’s the alpha and omega for most businesses. If you don’t have the right 
relations and trust towards your business partners, it becomes very difficult to 
do any kind of businesses in China today.” (Informant 6) 
 
In particular, as many informants emphasized, perception and importance of trust on a 
cultural level has a direct impact on how business relations get built and managed.  
 
“I would never have a deal or sign any contract with someone I don´t trust and 
don´t know well. I take a lot of precautions. I try to work a lot with someone to 
get to know them better, before doing any kind of partnership with them.” 
(Informant 3)  
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“Contracts are worthless in practice. If someone has the wrong intentions, they 
will do it in spite of contracts. I have few privileges here dependent on what is 
written in the contracts. Therefore I trust people more than contracts” 
(Informant 5) 
 
“If you are a small foreign company and are competing against a Chinese 
company, then you are doomed to fail. So even if there is breach of contracts 
there is no point in doing something about it. Relations are extremely important 
to the police and local officials.” (Informant 7) 
 
The importance of guanxi was emphasized by how business transactions were 
done with their partners. One of the informant emphasized that oral agreements 
are needed despite written contracts.  
 
“A contract I have with the company X, can be seen as rather loose. We have 
made policies and practice that goes beyond a written contract, in a way. It is 
based on relations we have with the company. This is very important. To be 
able to follow the contract, are relations needed, otherwise we have very little 
security”. (Informant 3) 
  
One of the informants disclosed that to strengthen the relationship with their Chinese 
partners they invited them to Norway, which had a significant effect on the 
development of trust and relationships. An indicator of the importance of relations can 
especially be noticed by rather long visits of the Chinese partner to Norway. Hence, in 
the Chinese business culture, relations are built over a longer timeframe.  
 
“You cannot just knock on a door and present yourself. You have to build a friendship 
and trust over a long-time.” (Informant 1) 
 
“You build trust over time and through personal relations (guanxi)” (Informant 6) 	  
“When we invited our Chinese partners to Norway over a longer period it was to build 
trust, to improve and to build relations. We saw that they had a good relationship with 
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many actors. They enjoyed the visit with big respect, which means that we enjoyed it 
too.” (Informant 2) 
 
However, building trust-based relationships can be challenging. Many informants 
expressed that the concept of guanxi is difficult to comprehend and that the trust 
building is time-consuming and there is no shortcut to it. It appears from one of the 
informants that any signs of haste or mentioning of time is interpreted by the Chinese 
as an unreliable situation and a cause for distrust: 
 
“It can take several weeks or months for instance before trust is developed and 
agreements can be made” (Informant 2) 
 
“We had contact with a partner for several months. Once at a meeting, I mentioned my 
time restriction. Strangely, I didn´t hear from them in several months, after that 
meeting.” (Informant 1)  
 
It was also pointed out from the informants that the Chinese focus more on individuals 
than the overall company. This can be supported by, for instance the importance of a 
good first impression at the meeting and having a good face (mianzi) further on. As 
one of the interviewees mentioned:  
 
 “To beat around the bush and to be diplomatic was my strategy in China. Take your 
time and make a good impression. You have to be careful to not offend anyone, at least 
not a manager in a higher position. The trust is gone if you argue or directly criticize a 
person. You should always bear in mind that it is normal to bring and receive gifts. 
The tradition is to give and then also to expect something in return. If you break it this 
norm, then you may be off the track.” (Informant 1) 
 
As the informants said, trust-building is done quite early on. It is clear that giving a 
good first impression is extremely important in the Chinese business culture. The 
importance of face value was especially mentioned, which also includes gift 
exchanges. This can be understood as reciprocity where if a person gives you 
something, they make an implicit “promise” to have further contact, especially to 
“retaliate” the received gift, hence building a relation to gain trust. However, it is 
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interesting that most of the informants see the exchanging of gifts as a challenge to 
keep a good face. This could be understood as Norwegian managers´ insecurity about 
where to draw the line between politeness and bribery, as the value of gifts is 
understood differently in Norway and China. Thus, being reluctant to receive and give 
gifts might lead to loss of the face and trust, thereby risking bad relations. 
 
“Receiving gifts can be challenging. It is about the value and I have to find a balance. 
In the West, this might be perceived as a bribe, while in Asia it is a part of the business 
culture.” (Informant 1) 
 
Moreover, informant 1 illustrated the importance of face through conflicts occurring in 
his company that resulted in the Chinese employees loosing face. Informant 3 
illustrated the face concept by pointing out that confronting or questioning the 
employees about their work was not an option, therefore she has to rather double check 
it herself. 
 
“Face is very important (…). We have experienced what it means to lose face for the 
Chinese. Things we find quite normal in our business culture, such as to point out 
defects and deficiencies, can be very dramatically for Chinese employees. We didn´t 
know about this, and that has caused a lot more conflicts than what we would have 
thought.” (Informant 1) 
 
“I have a saying: Assumption is a role of a mother fuckups. So I assume nothing. I 
don´t say anything, but I check and ensure things to clarify things many times” 
(Informant 3) 
  
It appears from all of the informants that there is no distinction between job and private 
life in China as in Norway. To build trust in China means to know a person´s private 
life, and thus bringing up family over a business meeting is not unusual. One of the 
informants claimed that private life and business life in China are connected to each 
other. The large family business market that still exists in China might explain the 
importance of relations. There has been no distinctions between private life and 
business because of that, thus these norms have been brought along and do not only 
influence family businesses but the whole business culture in China.  
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“It was totally strange for me to talk about my family over a business dinner, a dinner 
where I was supposed to discuss and agree on a business contract.” (Informant 2) 
 
Overall, there is no doubt that the Chinese history and culture has a big impact on the 
informants. The informants clarified that the importance of building trust is based on 
the strong Chinese history and culture. Considering that the Chinese history is over 
2000 years old, it is interesting to see that the Confucian thinking is still valuable in 
China today. 
 
“The Chinese history and culture has a huge impact when doing business in China 
today. I would say the Confucianism values, especially the authoritarian mindset is 
still extremely important today as it has been for 2000 years. It is important to respect 
your parents, manager and the government.” (Informant 4) 
 
It can be noted that it is “especially” important to show respect to people that are in a 
higher position, thus emphasizing the importance of hierarchy. Another informant 
highlights that even the degree of trust depends on your hierarchal position. This can 
be seen in correlation to a society with high power distance.  
 
“You cannot think like a Norwegian in China. It is very time-consuming to do business 
in China and difficult to find someone you can trust and vice versa. It depends on 
where you are in the hierarchy. (Informant 2) 
 
This explains why it takes longer time; only the “right” person in the hierarchy can 
perform the specific activity. It can be interpreted that a relation-based system is very 
ordered, which can be understood by lack of systematization that is established in a 
rule-based system. Thereby, the needs for such unwritten norms are necessary to make 
the relation-based system more organized.  
 
Some of the informants also stressed a concern and were annoyed by the fact that only 
people in the same position could communicate and could come to agreements with 
external partners. One of the informants specified that only people in the same 
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position, for example an executive director could speak to an executive director, and 
not a sales manager for instance.  
 
“It is not acceptable for a Chinese project manager to make decisions, he can only 
negotiate. The top manager, however, makes the decision. I, as a project manager, 
cannot ask or communicate directly with a director or an executive director. He will 
not take it seriously, therefore I would have to call my director with the same position 
as him, to communicate with him.” (Informant 2) 
 
An informant also elaborated on the relationship between trust and the hierarchical 
position by illustrating the importance of business cards in China:  
 
“I will normally be sent to people in the same position as me, when I show my business 
card. Thus business cards are extremely important to bring with you at all times, 
especially at the first meeting. Positions and titles are carefully studied.” (Informant 1) 
 
Similarly the hierarchy system is observed internally in the companies. Employees 
avoid disagreeing or having discussions in order to not ruin the harmony, especially 
with the managers. All the informants pointed out that this was a challenging area, 
because the leadership techniques they used in Norway could not be applied in China. 
One can clearly argue that a group´s need are put before the needs of the individual, as 
all the informants said it is impossible to get their Chinese employees to express their 
own opinion about different matters. This can also be understood as lack of 
individuality as the Chinese are afraid of making mistakes and thus reducing their face 
value. 
 
“The first meeting in China was a cultural shock. I expected everyone to contribute in 
the meeting. However I talked for two hours, without any interruptions or contribution 
from anyone, it was completely quiet.” (Informant 5) 
 
In a similar vein, informants have emphasized that their employees expect a powerful 
manager that gives clear instructions and has everything under control. Thus to meet 
their Chinese employee´s expectations, they need to adopt Chinese values. Therefore a 
dominant manager, who delegates tasks and gives clear guideline, is seen as a good 
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manager with control and that can be trusted. Thus, signs of weakness by the manager 
are seen as dishonorable and makes the employees doubt the leadership, whom they 
feel they cannot trust. The informants emphasized this as challenging, as they are from 
a rule-based governance system where there is more flexibility and less attention on 
control.  
 
“It is important to have control. If you in general don´t emphasize control your 
employees will think you have lost control, and thus you might lose both their respect 
and control. This is a sign of weakness, which all managers are afraid for.” (Informant 
4) 
 
“My employees have to get specific instructions. (…) If I give more general 
instructions, I don´t trust the work getting done. Therefore I have to show control and 
give them direct orders”. (Informant 2) 
 
Further, an interesting observation from the interviews was that all the informants said 
“he” every time the term of power was mentioned. It is clear that power is linked with 
the male gender or at least the dominant gender regarding power. Moreover, this was 
emphasized by a female informant, who had experienced her Chinese male colleague 
not taking her seriously as a manager. It can be understood that gender roles still have a 
big impact on Chinese business culture today.  
 
“The Chinese are very old fashioned when it comes to gender equality, age 
discrimination and such Western values (…) It was a male manager who had a strange 
attitude towards me and I felt that he didn’t take me seriously as a manager.” 
(Informant 3) 
 
To summarize the findings about China’s cultural values, it is clearly that the 
informants expressed trust as very important when doing business in China. However, 
there is no doubt that trust is built through relations (guanxi). The informants have to 
follow the cultural norms and everything related to relations, which is not always 
comfortable or suitable for them. They do share some values, such as pleasing and 
having a harmonic atmosphere. However, the informants have to adjust to the other 
values, such as being authoritative and commanding. Moreover, there appears to be 
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three main challenges for informants: 1.Relation-building (guanxi and mianzi) 2.Power 
distance and 3. Control.  
 
5.2	  The	  shift	  from	  relation-­‐based	  to	  rule-­‐based	  system	  	  
 
As mentioned above, relation-building, power distance and control are perceived as the 
most challenging aspects for the informants. These factors feature in a relation-based 
governance system. It can be argued that the relation-based system is still highly 
preserved in China. There is a common viewpoint and assessment about trust towards 
the Chinese governance system, expressed by most of the informants: there is no or 
very little trust towards the regulatory system. When the topic was first brought up, 
most of the informant laughed, as if it was a foolish question. However, when they 
realized the seriousness, some expressed it directly and some indirectly. It was 
expressed in this manner most directly: 
 
“I have generally a good dose of skepticism in most situations relating to trust to the 
Chinese governance system.“ (Informant 7) 
 
“The reason is that Chinese institutions are not mature, you cannot rely on or trust the 
system. The only thing you can trust is your own guanxi and of course yourself.” 
(Informant 4) 
 
Interestingly, informants 1 and 2, that have the Chinese government as their customer, 
used the term “we” as if they were representing their company when they at first did 
not wish to give a comment and mumbled carefully a positive attitude towards the 
system. It can thus be interpret as if they were not giving their own personal opinions.  
 
“We haven’t had much trouble with the government, we trust the government and find 
them reliable” (Informant 1) 
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However, they later had an indirectly contradicting opinion where they expressed that 
they could sense corruption in the system. Thus their confusion with governance 
questions, can be interpreted as “who would trust a system that is corrupted.” 
 
“We work with the Civil Aviation Authority, which is clearly politically regulated, and 
the people working there have attained their positions through political means. That is 
why we try to keep a neutral view, and don´t bring up any controversial political 
topics”. (Informant 1) 
 
All the informants either explicitly or implicitly expressed the following three reasons 
for distrusting the Chinese governance system: it is unpredictable, non transparent and 
unaccountable. 
 
The informants specified the system as very unpredictable as new laws can appear all 
of a sudden that influence their planning and processes in the organization. An 
informant explained these unpredictable circumstances as something one has to get 
used to, as it was the government´s way of creating stability in the form of control. The 
unpredictable situation in China causes the informants to feel insecure, hence: trust in 
the governance system is reduced. The informants´ distrusting towards the legal 
regulatory system might be greater than what an average Chinese citizen has towards 
the regulatory system, as the informants are used to a stable regulatory system, where 
changes occur based on democratic decisions. However, the informants also mentioned 
The Nobel Peace Prize event when they discussed trust towards the government. The 
connection can be understood by the way China handled the situation. It has caused 
unpredictable situations for the informants, especially regarding visa for multiple 
entries to China, thus causing distrust.  
 
“I don’t trust the government system in China because it is very unpredictable. There 
may come rules that fall into someone’s head suddenly that can change everything. 
You cannot trust that it is either persistent or well thought through. I feel it is very 
accidental, something might come along that you are not prepared for, but you have to 
adapt to it anyways. It can turn in any direction and you never know what will happen. 
You just have to keep focusing on your own setting, until it works.“ (Informant 3) 
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“ The risk is that there will always come some changes, so I have lived under many 
rules that had to be followed and they changes constantly all the time, depending on 
the governments.“ (Informant 4) 
 
“The risk it that changes always occur. My industry is not equity regulated, however it 
is strictly regulated in China, so I have followed many strict rules that change all the 
time.” (Informant 5) 
 
One informant specified the distrust towards the system by pointing out that what is 
promised to be done is not necessarily in China’s favor. And even if the policies that 
are made, the implementation of these policies would not be done successfully.  
 
“I have no trust in the system because it is unpredictable. I do not trust the system to 
want the best for its country. I don´t trust that the governance system will successfully 
implement what they say they will. …And this makes it difficult to work in the country 
when you don’t trust the system.” (Informant 4) 
 
 
Remarkably, it can also be argued that the new rules appear frequently. It shows the 
government is doing its utmost to make the country more rule-base although, as most 
of the informants pointed out, the regulation system is weak, e.g. “laws are quickly 
proclaimed, but slowly regulated.” (Informant 7) 
 
The informants also expressed unease towards how opaque the Chinese system is. Not 
only is the regulatory system non-transparent, but also are other actors such as big 
Chinese companies. Some of the informants pointed out that their Chinese customers 
would never tell them what they used the informants´ product for, even though their 
partnership with them was close and trust was established. The transparency can 
therefore said to be miniscule. Another important factor for transparency is freedom of 
speech and free media, which is highly controlled in China. The informants are used to 
a democratic, transparent regulatory system, thus finding this very challenging. It leads 
to suspicion and distrust of the system.   
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“It is difficult to work together because there are many people that keep their work to 
themselves. This means that they don’t share anything. We have experienced that there 
are a lot of secrets.” (Informant 2) 
 
The informant also expressed the unnecessary control exerted by the government that 
reduces transparency, and thus causes distrust. A transparent system is feature of a 
rule-based system, thus a non-transparent system would be a feature of relation-based 
system. Hence, the informants from a rule-based system are challenged in a non-
transparent system.  
 
“When the riots started in Hong Kong I was watching BBC News and suddenly my 
whole screen went blank for a minute (…) I later found out that all live broadcasting in 
China isn´t really live”. (Informant 1) 
“It is very strange to be in China and not be able to watch Norwegian news at 
NRK.no, because it´s blocked. Many webpages and companies are blocked, this is 
because they want control”. (Informant 2) 
 
“The system is very control-oriented (…) In China the debates in communities about 
different important matters are absent, because there are restrictions placed on what 
you can talk about without criticizing the government.” (Informant 3) 
 
Besides the nontransparent system, an unaccountable system is also a relation-based 
feature of society. What is interesting is that even though business contracts are an 
obvious way to establish security in a rule-based society, it seems like most of the 
informants have to take risks and take their chances on the agreement. The lack of faith 
in the judiciary is the obvious reason. Directly and indirectly most of the informants 
expressed that they are doubtful about the information given in the contracts and the 
possibility of a breach of contracts is high. 
 
One of the informants says that breaches of contract often occur in China and mostly 
do not lead to any serious consequences. Another informant mentioned payment issues 
from customers, hence the contracts where not upheld, with no consequences. One 
specified that there is little point to going to court with such issues, as the locals have 
better lawyers that knows the system better, plus the payment will eventually come. 
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Some of the other informants expressed the same concern. A noteworthy connection is 
that informants with small companies expressed the greatest distress. It can be 
observed that Norwegian small firms are very small compared to their Chinese 
counterparts so the power and advantage the locals have is huge. The governance 
system contains a weak legal regulation, which means that major consequences do not 
follow when someone breaches their contract, especially in a favor for locals. 
 
“The juridical system is very poor. You can´t trust it, because it is one party nation, 
and that one party manages the judiciary, all the laws and the whole judicial system. 
Therefore you can´t expect to have a fair treatment in a trial.” (Informant 3) 
 
“I don’t trust that the system will implement what it is supposed to”. 
 (Informant 4) 
 
Several informants have emphasized the little faith in the information given in the 
contracts, breach in contracts and low trust in Chinese people in general, particularly 
those informant that speak Chinese. It demonstrates the connection between informal 
and formal institutions. And that those who understand the language have a better 
understanding and are aware of what is actually happening around them. It can also be 
seen in parallel to the relation-based governance system, where particularized trust is 
common. However, several of the informant also use interpreter during their business 
meetings with their Chinese partners, which they see as rather an unfavorable situation. 
They cannot trust the translator fully, and they do not know whether the job is being 
done in the favor for them or not. Informants emphasized distrust towards Chinese 
people stating: 
 
“(…) I waste a lot of energy confirming things all the time, to ensure that everything is 
as it is supposed to be. This is because I trust very very few people. I can´t count on 
anyone or anything” (Informant 3)  
 
“We have had Chinese translators with us during many business meetings, and that is 
obviously not so beneficial” (Informant 2) 
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Another informant pointed out that often they and their Chinese partners do not have a 
common understanding of what is being agreed on and hence being written in the 
contract. There is a doubt and uncertainty about whether the Chinese pretend that they 
do not understand, whether they interpret the contract differently or that there are 
actual communication problems. Thus it indicates that there are trust issues between 
Chinese partners and the informants.  
 
“The difference between Norway and China is the transparency and honesty regarding 
contracts, which is absent in China. There is a lack of common understanding in China 
and what is regulated in contracts. I don´t trust the contracts regarding legislation”. 
(Informant 7) 
 
However, the informants from the large companies, feel more secure, and expressed 
they could trust the contract, even though compared to Norway the trust was reduced. 
It can be argued that since larger companies have more power, they feel more secure, 
and have access to valuable resources that protect them. 
 
”It is mostly the government we do business with, not the political government, but a 
governmental organization. We haven´t had much trouble after signing the contracts, 
so yes, we trust the government and the system” (Informant 1) 
 
It can be argued that the judicial system is not transparent, and people (actors/business) 
are not convinced that corruption or prejudice will be brought to justice. This is 
particularly due to the judiciary not being independent, and therefore will not be 
accountable. The informants´ distrust in the legal regulatory system might be greater 
than the distrust an average Chinese citizen has towards the regulatory system, as the 
managers are used to a stable, transparent and accountable regulatory system in 
Norway.  
 
“Clearly, corruption is a big problem. The Chinese understand that if they get exposed 
it will be unacceptable, thus they never expose themselves for us, but regardless we 
know there is something fishy and underhand going on back in the chain.” 
 (Informant 2) 
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“There is a lot of corruption in China, even though I haven´t experienced it where I 
work. I have clearly seen it, but it hasn´t affected me. (…) I don´t trust it because it is 
corrupt… corruption is very widespread.” (Informant 3) 
 
“It is clear that those companies that are involved with the government are more 
corrupt, there are more corruption higher up in the system, at least more than what is 
further down in the system. (…) If the government owns the companies, then it is very 
difficult to stay away from corruption, because they still play by the same rules.” 
(Informant 4) 
 
“…I have very little trust in this. Unfortunately, there is a lot of corruption, which 
often destroys the fair treatment of cases.” (Informant 5) 
 
Thus, it can be argued that in general the informants feel that the government and the 
regulatory system lack credibility, hence the informants have low generalized trust.  	  
Despite the changes occurring in China, which are, is apparent for everyone in the 
world, it can be argued whether people inside China feel it to the same extent. When 
the informants were asked about China´s transition, they were a little confused about it 
and could not name or notice any changes at first. However, after a short discussion, 
they could name a few. Overall, informants did not observe any cultural and normative 
changes. However, all of the informants mentioned some general changes.   
 
“Cultural changes; I will say that China has become more and more Westernized.” 
(Informant 1) 
 
“When it comes to people, the transition is much slower than the technology.” 
(Informant 3) 
 
“There haven’t been any big revolutionary changes in Chinese people´s mindset since 
I have been in China”. (Informant 7) 
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Furthermore, informants have noticed changes in the practice of gift giving, because of 
stricter laws. The large and valuable gift giving, which is a part of mianzi and guanxi, 
have been reduced in recent years as well as invitations to large dinners, although small 
gifts and dinners are still an obvious and ongoing tradition. It can be arguable whether 
only foreign businesses are most affected by these rules, or in general all domestic 
companies as well. 
 
“It is clear that there have been fewer dinners and fewer valuable gifts in recent years.  
It seems that laws have become stricter. Especially exchanging gifts, which can be 
understood by us as corruption.” (Informant 2) 
 
The informant from one of the large companies pointed out that importance of relations 
has decreased, though face value is still very important. It can be interpreted as 
relations being less important when you are a large company with a good reputation. 
However to preserve your reputation in the market, face value is important. It may be 
also correlated to the fact that changes are happening, although very gradually, as only 
one of the informants emphasized it.   
 
“Face value is extremely important, I think now it is more important than guanxi for 
business purpose” (Informant 7) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the power distance that contributes to the hierarchical system is 
still a challenging factor for the informants. Thus all of the informants tried to change 
the organizational structure, with different outcomes. One of the informants 
emphasized:  
 
“I have few employees that are over 40 years old. It is clear that they have greater 
difficulties in accepting changes in the organizational structure in contrast to the 
younger employees.” (Informant 7) 
 
It is recognized that it is more challenging for the older generation to accept the 
changes from a highly centralized top-down structure to a more decentralized, flat 
hierarchy. The power distance has been transferred from generation to generation. 
Therefor it can be argued that the difficulty of changing the older generation can be 
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interpreted as the younger generation finding it easier to accept changes, and are thus 
more open-minded.  
 
Moreover, several informants expressed the challenges to get employees to contribute 
or work together in large groups, develop new ideas and be more open-minded. This 
may be seen in parallel to the fear of losing face (mianzi).  
 
"Normally, they wait to get all the ideas from me and expect me to tell them what to do. 
I don´t or won´t work like that. So I have to constantly say that all good thoughts are 
important and all ideas will be considered and listened to. It's fine to express an idea 
even if it is wrong. This is something the Chinese don’t understand." (Informant 4) 
 
The few or very insignificant cultural and normative changes can be explained by the 
unique Chinese history. Several informants emphasized that the Chinese are very 
nationalistic and therefore do not see the need for change.  
 
“What is important to think about is that the Chinese are very proud, they are very 
proud of their own culture and country. And a lot of them don´t see the need to get 
influence from outside, because they can manage it themselves. They have done it in 
the past and throughout their history.” (Informant 3) 
 
 
Even though informants emphasized no big changes they have experienced in general, 
most of the informants emphasized regulatory changes.  
 
“In a way it has become more secure, because you have good documentations and 
check what you do more closely. You have greater legal protection as a company, 
which I think the Chinese government works a lot with”. (Informant 3) 
 
“I sense a more deterrent attitude from the government, and that they have started to 
become stringent on immoral behaviour at every level”. (Informant 7)  
 
Changes in the regulatory system were observed through implementation of more and 
stricter laws, with a particularly remarkable legal change in terms of corruption.  
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“Corruption turnover has just been insane. We notice it clearly in our office. Human 
Resource policy has changed; there have been fewer bonuses. We’re not allowed to eat 
at expensive restaurants anymore because we have to keep ourselves within the 
company’s regulations. It has been stricter the last few years. So we have definitely 
noticed it.” (Informant 3) 
 
“The most noteworthy changes are how the political parties introduce very strict 
sanctions on corruption. But winning a case on corruption is not so normal anymore.” 
(Informant 4) 
 
“Now there are fewer Chinese companies that use bribery and illegal businesses in 
China, which is positive. A focus area for governments is to overcome the corruption 
that exists today. But having a good relationship with customers and suppliers, is still 
as important as before.” (Informant 7) 
 
Even though many of the informants clarified that corruption had been reduced, they 
also emphasized it could still be found higher up in the system. This means that 
corruption has not been necessarily been reduced in China per se, but it might be 
explained by government’s separate regulations for foreign investors and 
organizations. Their trust towards the legal regulatory system has not increased, despite 
the government’s effort of reducing corruption, which means that indirectly they still 
sense and observe corruption. 
 
Two of the informants also mentioned that the Chinese had become more materialistic, 
and the increase in this dimension can be linked to an increase in corruption, and thus 
informants distrust towards other actors (people).  
 
“In terms of social culture, I would say that there is a strong tendency towards a 
materialistic mindset. More than ever, it is now about earning money and getting rich. 
Morals and principles that were important before are not in focus anymore.” 
(Informant 6) 
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Another important factor is having free press for more openness and to be able to 
expose these matters and hold officials to account. The informants have experienced a 
great amount of censorship in the media in the past years, especially for international 
(social) media. Media is seen as the fourth estate or fourth power. Because of its 
influence and power, it can therefore be argued that the government does not want to 
lose their existing means of control and power, as they have already lost some power 
by opening up to international trade and an open market. Hence control has increased. 
Its effect on corruption is rather bad, as it is difficult to uncover corruption scandals 
when the media is highly regulated and therefore distrusted. Transparency is imported 
in monitoring business sectors especially corruption.  
 
“It is a lot more censored on the social medias now, than before.” (Informant 1) 
 
“Facebook is not allowed, Instagram is not allowed. All media that can easily and 
quickly disseminate information is censored.“ (Informant 5) 
 
“As you know, the Internet censorship in China is quite strict. Internet sites like 
Google, Facebook, YouTube and Instagram are blocked. How can we then trust the 
government?” (Informant 6) 	  
An interesting noticeable thing is that all the informants mentioned control in some 
way when changes in China were mentioned. It looks like the Chinese government is 
trying to exert more control in the past few years. The Nobel Peace Prize event was 
also mentioned by all of the informants, and they stated that it had caused them more 
practical difficulties such as Visa restrictions, but none had been directly affected in 
any other way. The Nobel Peace Prize event has even caused restrictions on who 
comes and goes to Norway from China. It can be interpreted as control intensification; 
where the government is trying to control and minimize the influence from outside the 
Chinese boarders. 
 
“It’s difficult to get a visa with multiple entries now. I have to apply every time and it 
takes much longer than it took before. But we have not been exposed to a direct 
contradiction in political unwillingness.” (Informant 1) 
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“There are many Chinese that are not allowed to travel to Norway from their state. 
(…) It was easier to get multiple entries, one year ago. (…) But if you have a good 
relationship with the embassy, then you might get two entries.” (Informant 4) 
 
 “The biggest change or problem is regarding the Nobel Peace Prize. China has lost 
face and Norway had an influence. It is not the political background as people think, 
but rather how the way Norway responded which Chinese people cannot understand. 
And it is a debate that Norwegian companies have received, influenced and started 
negotiating over. So within a few years, when Norway has apologized in some way, 
then things will be better, but China have clearly lost face. And they have done it 
globally. “(Informant 5)	  
 
The interesting observation is that even though rule of law has improved and even 
slight regulatory improvements have been observed, some informants implicitly and 
some more explicitly expressed that they still have to rely on relations, and additionally 
follow rules. 
  
“I can´t predict that contracts are followed (…). We have made rules and procedures 
that go beyond legal contracts, which are based on relations. This is extremely 
important. Relations have to be maintained for the sake of contractual procedure to go 
right, otherwise you have very little security” (Informant 3) 
 
“Rule of law and relations exist side by side. Rule of law is in addition to relations.” 
(Informant 4) 
 
Concluding, the findings show that the smaller the companies are the lower the 
generalized trust is. Hence, it is indicated that large companies have more generalized 
trust, though it is still low. Furthermore, small businesses have to rely more on 
relations compared to large companies. However, it should be noted that relations are 
important independent of size of industry type, the difference being the degree of 
importance. Table 6 shown below is a summary of the empirical findings. The table 
describes different trust indicators and whether there are any changes noticed.  
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It is clearly that China’s culture and history still has a big impact regarding trust in 
today’s business culture, hence the practice of relation-building and the hierarchical 
system. The indicator of corruption has clearly reduced from the past, as well some 
aspects of mianzi, where it can be linked to bribery. Additionally, this has led to 
significantly stricter laws and regulations, which means that control has increased. 
These changes can be linked to the shift from relation-based to a rule-based system.  
 
Table 6 Trust indicators: Before and after, customized by the authors, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TRUST INDICATORS  BEFORE AFTER 
Practice of guanxi Great value:  
- Extremely important for 
everyone  
 
Great value: 
- Extremely important for small 
companies 
- Very important for large 
companies 
Power distance Important  Important  
Corruption Huge Less (decreased)  
Control Much  Excessive (increased) 
Mianzi Great Value: Very important Important (decreased) 
Rules Little regulation Many more rules: 
- Better regulation for larger 
companies (increased)  
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CHAPTER 6 RELATIONSHIP-BUILDERS OR 
RULE-FOLLOWERS?  
 
In this Chapter we will discuss how findings presented in Chapter 5 may be interpreted 
and explained through the theoretical framework built in the Chapter 3. Our interest is 
to examine and understand organizations, particularly managers’ trust challenges in 
transition economies, through the lens of multiple theories.  Institutional theory will be 
used to explain the findings and answer the research question. The structure of the 
empirical work is in accordance to the theoretical model. The findings indicated that 
Norwegian managers face challenges due to China´s transition. The challenges that 
have been found relate to both the relation-based system and the rule-based system. 	  
6.1	  First	  signs	  of	  transition	  	  	  
Since 1979 China has been undergoing significant changes, starting with economical 
reform. Gradually, significant changes have also occurred in corporate governance, 
such changes have been in stock exchange (Ho, 2003c), company law (legal 
requirement), opening up for private ownership (Li, 2013), accounting law (IFRS) and 
guidelines for listed companies (Ho, 2003c). All these changes have taken place with 
the aim of China´s economic growth. This transformation is said to be essential to a 
country´s long-term development process. Changes in the economical forces in the 
institutional exogenous environment, such as the transition from a traditional economy 
to a more market-friendly economy in China, are forces for institutional change. The 
institutional changes can affect the normative, cognitive and regulatory institutions. 
The transformation progress varies among countries, relative to the degree of internal 
resistance that comes from a country’s culture and history, which also includes its legal 
heritage. Its impact on institutional change is great, and determines the speed of 
change. In China´s case, with its unique and rich historical and cultural roots, the 
transformation is expected to progress rather slowly. However, the findings reveal that 
within some areas, i.e. the cognitive and normative, there are no significant 
developments at the moment. This can be understood as the early phase of transition 
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where these areas are resistant to change. This is supported by North (1990) that points 
out that the formal rules can change overnight through political and judicial decisions, 
but the informal restrictions such as traditions, codes and norms are more impermeable 
to change and to policy execution. Significant changes in cognitive and normative 
institutions have not been noticed, which can be explained by Kostova and Roth´s 
(2003) concept of institutional baggage. The Confucian mindset and its cultural value 
base will be especially resistant to change. This will have and has had an impact on the 
transition from a relation-based to a rule-based governance system. Relations´ (guanxi) 
importance was a common recognition among all informants, and was considered 
crucial for a company´s external environment. It can be argued that it may slow down 
China´s transition or it can also be possible that China would never fully transform to a 
rule-based governance system, at least not as a Western rule-based system. 
 
Interesting findings about transition came to light from the empirical study. There is a 
clear indication that China has increased its control after its economic transition. It 
indicates that the transition has caused more controlling policies that have a negative 
reaction and have caused distrust towards the regulatory system. It can be considered 
that the government has calculated the possibilities of uncertainty during the shift from 
relation-based system to a more rule-based system. Increased control can thus be 
interpreted as the Chinese government’s strategy to maintaining control during the 
transition. Increasing control can therefore be said to be reasonable. Moreover, it can 
also then explain the increased restrictions on visa entries into China after the Nobel 
Peace Prize event in 2010. It can be viewed as the Chinese government´s approach to 
keeping control in a transitional phase with high uncertainty. It can be implied that the 
relatively inconsistent and gradually evolving control that originates from the Chinese 
government has contributed to distrust towards the formal institutions, and in fostering 
a low generalized trust	  	  
As China is now a member of the World Trade Organization, and is committed to 
following certain rules and regulations, regulatory changes can be expected. More 
accurate and stricter rules within corporate governance have been established (World 
Bank, 2014), which affects corporate governance both in a negative and positive way. 
It should be noted that China is a relation-based country and has always, as other 
relation-based societies, had many formal rules. However, the avoidance of these rules 
	   77	  
has been because of unfair enforcement methods. In recent years when rules and 
regulations have become stricter, and there is a rapid increased of foreign direct invest 
in China, changes in regulative institutions should be expected. 
 
A common understanding among the informants is that the legal regulatory system is 
not accountable; it does not have fair enforcement, nor is it transparent. Arguably, it 
may be that the informants´ trust perception makes the situation worse than what it 
actually is. Having a background and value base from a welfare state can make their 
expectations and expectations of a governance system higher, and therefore they 
cannot trust the formal institutions in China even though there are opportunities for it, 
although compared to Norway it may be very weak.  	  
The empirical findings show sign of both a relation-based and rule-based governance 
system. There are evidently changes going on that are implicitly affecting them, 
however, the informants are very static and have not noticed many changes. It can be 
argued that they have not noticed them yet. Firstly, it should be pointed out that the 
confusion among the informants about whether there are any changes occurring in 
China at all, indicates there might be possibility that they do not take the opportunities 
that have been given to them. There is an opportunity of using the rules hat have been 
established in favor for international business in China, such opportunities may be seen 
in the reduction in gifts values (mianzi). Room is left for the implementation and 
practice of these rules. At the same time, some of the changes have started to be 
realized by the informants, implicitly. Nevertheless, legal and regulatory changes are 
not only apparent on record, but the empirical findings also clearly indicate changes. 
New rules have been implemented and some are enforced. These are signs of a shift to 
a more rule-based society.  	  
China is going through a transition where there is increasing implementation and 
advancement of more rules that are fair, transparent and efficient are advancing, this 
should in fact foster generalized trust and reduce particularized trust per se. Weak 
institutions cause distrust and uncertainty for formal institutions, which also has an 
effect on informal institutions. Other´s behavior cannot be predicted, and thus foster 
distrust in informal institutions as well. The only approach is to build trust based on 
relations, thus force particularized trust (Li, 2009). There is a connection between 
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degree of rule of law and people who trust others (Li, 2009). The transformation phase 
will determine the degree of formal trust and existence of generalized trust, and thus 
forms informal trust and importance and need of guanxi can be reduced.  
 
Theoretically and empirically it shows that institutions have a great impact on 
organizations. It is apparent that most of the informants have particularized trust, and 
therefore need to invest in relations. Generalized trust can only be found among the 
informants from large companies. This in fact can be argued for regulatory changes are 
being prioritized on larger foreign companies at this stage of transition. It may also be 
that the large companies have certain power that would make their partners reluctant 
for doing any kind of fraud, and the system keeping an extra eye on these companies. 
In this case, where rule of law has increased, trusting other people should then also 
have increased, and thus reduced the value of particularized trust (Luo, 1995). 
However, the informants have low generalized trust, though in theory where regulatory 
institutions have improved, generalized trust should be present. The key feature of 
relation-based societies is exactly the reason why the informants have low trust 
towards the formal institutions: rules are not fairly made and constantly applied. It can 
therefor be understood that the perception of trust indicates a more relation-based 
society than a rule-based society.  
 
Surprisingly, most of the indicators for trust challenges noticed in the findings, indicate 
occurrence of ceremonial changes. The shift from a relation-based to a rule-based 
system in China has resulted in the establishment of new rules and policies. The system 
has started to change, but it is not homogeneous. However, these changes are rather 
ceremonial, which means that things are not implemented in practice. Some changes 
being followed, others are ceremonial.  	  
The Chinese government has since it opened its doors to international trade 
emphasized a war against corruption. Many rigid rules targeting corruption have been 
implemented and regulatory changes have even been noticed. The informants noticing 
reduction in corruption can be explained by the rules and regulations mainly being 
concentrated towards foreign companies as statistically corruption has increased in 
China in recent years. The observed reduction in corruption may also be explained by 
China´s gradual change and with the starting point being the foreign companies, which 
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in fact is logical as it makes foreign direct investment easier, thus attracting more 
foreign direct investment, which clearly will give China more economic growth. It may 
have facilitated a quicker adoption of rules for foreign companies in China. Adaptation 
of IFRS and social security systems are perfect examples on the implementation of 
rules directed at foreign companies in China. Cross-border interactions between 
various actor groups push the system and force institutional change faster than what it 
would have been without cross-border interactions. However, problems and conflicts 
between different institutional logics globally can be considered as a major source of 
institutional change or a major source of challenges. Thus one may say that foreign 
players follow a set of rules of the game, while different classes of domestic players 
follow a different set of rules. The co-existence of dual regulatory institutions during 
the whole transition period provides plenty of opportunities and work as a catalyst for 
corrupt practices. This can explain the highly observed reduction in corruption by the 
informants, while the overall corruption statistics for China tell us otherwise. 
Informants that are from a highly developed institutional system regard these laws 
positively and see them as an opportunity for further investment, however domestic 
views can be different, and can take the opportunity rather in the opposite direction. It 
gives the domestic companies a competitive advantage over the foreign ones. 
However, it will make the transition period more difficult, challenging and 
disadvantageous for foreign companies in China.  It can thus be argued that it is a 
possibility that foreign companies decouple, where there is a gap between policy and 
practice for corruption, because of the disadvantageous position they are placed in.  
 
Although, the significance of corruption laws is highlighted by severe penalties, China 
has still been ranked as no. 100 in CPI index (Transparency, 2014). It can thus be 
argued that it is rather a sign of ceremonial change. As these changes have been 
implemented but not in practice. The possibility for a ceremonial change can be argued 
to be a result of external pressure and the requirement from WTO after China´s 
membership.  The lack of trust in the legal system among most of the informants can 
be understood by the increased uncertainty that has been created by the ceremonial 
change.  
 
Corruption seems to influence directly on the trust of formal institutions, and thus on 
informal institutions, which was highlighted by several informants. The lack of trust 
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towards the formal institutions indicates that laws remain ink on paper and are not 
fairly and efficiently enforced. The steps towards implementing rules are established, 
however the next step should be towards credibility of enforcement of rules that exist 	  
6.2	  Decoupling  	  	  
Regarding the shift from a relation-based to a more rule-based system, it can be 
understood that the relations-based system has more impact in China than the rule-
based system. 
Relations were essential for getting things done when the legal institutions were 
immature. Guanxi is seen as a transactional mechanism in countries where institutions 
are undeveloped (Li, 2009). After China´s economic reform and becoming a major 
player in the global arena (Sheh, 2008), it would seem like the importance of relations 
would decrease. However, it seems otherwise; its importance remains. It can be argued 
though that the need for guanxi is not only due to the lack of legal rules or weak laws 
in China. Otherwise greater changes affecting guanxi would have been visible. 
However, it is embedded in the Chinese people through Confucianism. 
The practice of the guanxi concept in the organization is rather a requirement than a 
choice for the informants and is a result of institutional pressure from regulatory 
institutions and cognitive institutions, (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Use of relations in 
organizational activities, which is rather time consuming and costly, can be considered 
as institutional isomorphism and institutionalized practice in China. The guanxi 
concept is institutionalized because it has a rule-like status, which has to be followed 
during all business exchanges, and is resistant to change. The practice is not questioned 
domestically and without the practice in the organizations activities, the organizations 
fail to gain legitimacy and are doomed to fail. The practice there to secure transactions 
and to secure social approval (legitimacy), which provides survival benefits. Findings 
indicate that the informants have reduced organizational efficiency, as they are used to 
a more efficient system, where processes take a shorter time. It can be argued that to 
reduce relations´ importance and to formalize the arrangements, the only option is to 
reinforce legal regulations and political sanctions. Although reducing its value can be 
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argued for, whether it will ever disappear in corporate governance is rather a foolish 
prediction as it is not only needed due to regulatory pressure, but also because it has 
long roots in Chinese history. This has been passed on from generation to generation, 
and is widely accepted and applied, without debate. Hofstede (1991) highlighted this 
relational phenomenon as long-term orientation (LTO), where China is found to have 
one of the highest ranks.  
As discussed earlier, the practice of guanxi is still highly regarded and is a critical 
success factor when doing business in China. Surprisingly, the importance of relations 
(guanxi) in an organization is highlighted by the occurrence of several decoupling. 
However, this case identified sign of two types of decoupling. 
 
The decoupling occurred when the managers opposed their own organization´s policy 
by not taking any legal stand against their external members when they were supposed 
to (Bromley and Powell, 2012). Taking a legal stand is a normal organizational policy 
when issues such as delayed payment and property rights. It was stressed that good 
relations are very important to preserve, and a legal stand should only be taken in 
extreme situations or as a last resort, as there is a great risk of breaking relations 
(guanxi). There might also be a risk of loosing the face and thus the reputation among 
other external Chinese members. Breaking relations may reduce the organization´s 
efficiency, as guanxi´s role in organizations activities is as a support system, especially 
during transition period with high uncertainty. Therefore, decoupling from 
organization´s policy and saving the guanxi, is needed. However, policy-practice 
decoupling may become less common, when the formal institutions are more 
developed and emphasize transparency and accountability. In other words when the 
transitions is more mature and the rule-based governance system is the dominant 
system and the relations-based governance system the weaker one. It can also be 
argued that the decoupling occurs because an organization is not able to achieve its 
goals if there relations are not preserved. This indicates a means-ends decoupling, 
where there is a gap between means and ends. 
 
There is a difference between how relation-based and a rule-based system manage 
contracts. In a rule-based system most of the transactions are based on impersonal and 
explicit agreements, where the state can fairly enforce contracts (Boundy, 2010). Thus, 
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the need of trust between contractual parties is not needed; the trust is rather placed in 
the system. In a relation-based governance system, companies largely rely on relations; 
hence personal and implicit agreements, where in general the state is not able to 
impartially enforce contracts. Therefore, mutual relations are the basis between two 
transaction parties. Even though China is in transition, the need of guanxi is still there. 
When managers, from a rule-based governance system have a transaction with 
managers from a relation-based governance system, sign of means-ends decoupling 
may show.  In addition to written contracts, the managers have the need to 
communicate oral agreements, as written contracts tend to not be followed fully. 
Further, contracts do not hold the same position for the rule-based managers, and thus 
the establishment of relations is a must. Oral agreements based on relations are a more 
trustworthy mode of agreement, in addition to the written contracts. It can be argued 
that keeping a balance in between these two modes, are necessary. Decoupling 
between means and ends may occurs when the managers want to prevent real 
organization consequences and not wanting to risk work activities and thus the 
organization´s outcome. In this situation managers do not follow formal structures. 
Such formal structures may be, as informants indicated, to do transaction agreements 
both written and orally, where it is clearly room for misunderstandings. Thus, means-
end decoupling can explain why managers implement a set of practices, such as oral 
agreements.   	  
As corruption that has been the main focused area for improvements and changes, the 
practice of gift exchange (mianzi) has also been considered. The regulatory focus is 
specific to the value of the gift/favor, to differentiate between bribery and gift. 
However, gift exchanges are still an ongoing practice, though partially reduced, and 
can be argued to be another sign of ceremonial change. By following the policy and 
without the practice, getting the work done in China is rather difficult. Therefore it can 
be argued that the practice of exchanging gifts can also be seen as a policy-practice 
decoupling. Especially as it is can be considered as a ceremonial change, and not been 
fully implemented and is weakly monitored. The practice is still a necessity for 
companies in China as the practice is rooted in the Confucianism teachings and thus 
highly regarded in China. It can therefore be argued that the decoupling occurs in order 
to maintain guanxi, which help the organization´s activities to be more efficient. As the 
practice allows the formal building of relationships and mutual trust, hence having a 
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mianzi gives advantage such as good credit history or social currency in business and 
social circles (Chen, 2001). It	   may	   be	   argued	   that	   these	   ceremonial	   changes	  increase	   uncertainty	   for	   the	  managers,	   as the policy have shifted from a relation-
based to a more rule-based system but in practice the shift is stagnant. 
It may also be considered as means-ends decoupling, where the implementation of the 
rules for gift exchange may cause managers to not be able to reach their targets and get 
their work done. Especially as it is can be considered as a ceremonial change, and not 
been fully implemented by all actors and is weakly monitored.  
  
In a transition economy, such as China, where the government is intensively 
implementing new rules, decoupling might appear. From the findings this was stated as 
rather demanding and challenging. The managers are put in an unpredictable situation, 
where they have to be ready for any kind of changes, constantly. It can be argued that 
these unpredictable situations are tougher on the informants because they belong to a 
society with higher uncertainty avoidance than Chinese societies. Chinese societies 
have low uncertainty avoidance and are more flexible to unstable environments 
(Hofstede, 2005). However, this unpredictable situation may cause managers to 
decouple from their own organization´s policies and formal structures because of the 
gap between means and ends. Following organization´s objectives and the long-term 
strategy plan may result in organization´s outcome not being reached. Regulatory 
pressure in this transition process may require a more flexible objectives and strategy 
plan, and thus the need of decoupling from the fixed strategies and objectives may 
occur.  	  
In this ongoing transition process, decoupling has been identified. For the managers it 
brings dilemma. Does the decoupling bring opportunities and flexibilities, where 
managers can now choose between these dual situations or does it bring uncertainty 
about how to behave? 	  
The Norwegian organization structure has its base from the ideology behind the 
welfare state model “The harmony model”.  This means that different social classes, 
employers and employees, and the state and citizens have common interests, societal 
respect for each other’s roles and a common understanding of rules. The model 
assumes that groups in the society do not oppress one another, but are interdependent 
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(Bru, 2013). The flat organization structure can thus said to be institutionalized 
practice in Norwegian companies. The typical practice of vertical structure is widely 
accepted and resistant to change.  
 
The Norwegian culture is based on values such as democracy, the rule of law and 
freedom of speech, and features a strong feeling of fairness and egalitarianism. 
Norwegians tend to emphasise emotional independence, privacy, and individual need. 
Positive consequences of their own actions and goals are preferred. These features can 
only be conserved by a decentralized management, and symbolize the Norwegian 
welfare state. The decentralized management style is a standardized practice, which is 
expected to be found and executed in Norwegian companies. It can thus be considered 
as an institutionalized practice, especially because the practice is a result of 
institutional pressures from all the three cognitive, regulative and normative aspects.  
 
However, in contrast to Norwegian organizational structure, the Chinese organization 
structure is in a hierarchical order. The hierarchical system is a normative demand 
based on moral principles from the Confucian teaching. This can also be supported by 
Hofstede´s Power Distance Dimension, which China is categorized as. The top-down 
organization structure is regarded as an institutionalized practice and considered 
institutional isomorphism in China, because it has a rule-like status. 
 
As Norway, the Chinese management style is based on “The harmony model”. 
However, they are rather seen in contradiction to one another. The Chinese 
management style is highly centralized and is based on Confucius teachings. It can be 
explained by the Confucius saying, “Let the ruler act like a ruler, the subject do his 
duty as a subject…” (Chan and Young, 2011:24), where a ruler’s (or manager’s) duty 
is to show responsibility and control, and a subject (or employee’s) is to obey and get 
the work given done. Harmony is achieved when everyone obeys their civic duties 
(Lau and Young, 2013). The Chinese harmony model prioritizes group harmony and 
long-term relationships. Whereas in the Norwegian harmony model prioritizes 
individuality, which Hofstede (1991) describes in his theory. These are unwritten laws 
that are embedded in Chinese cultural roots and are thereby difficult to change. Thus, 
the centralized management style is an institutionalized practice and can be found in 
Chinese organizations.   
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The transition from a relation-based system to a rule-based system has not yet affected 
the view on power distance that forms the organizations structure and management 
style. This case shows that a nation´s values and norms have a strong influence at an 
organizational level, which the informants stressed. These norms and values go against 
and are opposed to Norwegian managers´ values and work norms.  
 
In Norwegian companies with Norwegian managers in China, these contradicting work 
norms and values are challenging factors. These challenges were clearly emphasized 
by the informants. The challenges arise because the Norwegian managers work most 
efficiently under a flat organization structure and decentralized management style, 
whereas the Chinese employees work more efficiently under a hierarchical 
organizational structure and centralized management style. It also has an affect on trust 
perception. In Norway, trust is understood as being open and honest to their managers, 
employees and subordinates, whereas trust depends on keeping someone face value by 
direct confrontations and arguments in China. Norwegian managers trust their 
employees when they have an open dialogue and commonly share ideas, which is 
contradicting to the Chinese employees trust perception. Chinese employees trust their 
managers when the managers show control and delegate the work task systematically, 
for the work is done in a more efficient and in a correct manner. To support this, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions show China and Norway as one of the opposing 
countries regarding power distance (Hofstede, 1980), and thus explain the challenge 
informants face. 
 
The Norwegian managers are confronted with distinct sets of isomorphic pressures and 
institutionalized practices from both the Chinese and Norwegian environment. The 
necessity of maintaining legitimacy from both sides challenges Norwegian managers. 
This dual intuitional situation causes managers to decouple.  
 
The decoupling that occurs is because of the gap between policy and practice. The 
response can said to be a form of decoupling: where the managers maintain internal 
structure, flat organizational structure, to signal legitimacy. On the other hand, they 
signal the adaptation of certain practices to the external environment, such as 
centralized decision-making. Thus, the decoupling can said to be a loose one, from 
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both sides, to maximize the organizations efficiency. This also sustains both 
employees’ and the manager´s trust. The it indicates that balancing between both 
relation-based and rule-based systems are necessary in transition economies.  	  
In summary, at the conceptual level, our analysis suggests that institutional contexts 
are complex. China´s cultural values are, empirically and theoretically, indicated to be 
constant. Thus it can be argued that China will probably not have a rule-based 
governance system similar to the West, but rather go in its own direction. As long as 
the new institutions dominated by rule-based governance system are not established, 
the need for a more relation-based governance system will not be reduced. It is clear 
that the absence of generalized trust requires particularized trust. Importance of guanxi 
is thus still essential as there is low informal trust.  
 
 Even though a greater number of formal rules and regulations have started to change 
towards a more rule-based governance system, relying on the new rules is still likely to 
outweigh their benefits. Existence of both rule-based and relation-based systems has 
caused a hybrid situation. The changes that are observed can be understood as signs of 
ceremonial changes. The ceremonial changes are mainly because only polices have 
changed, but in practice, the rules are not enforced and transactions are done in the 
same manner as in a rule-based system. The hybrid situation has brought opportunity 
for decoupling. Interestingly, signs of decoupling have mainly been seen in a move 
away from the rule-based practice rather than towards a more rule-based practice. This 
in fact, implies that the transition phase is on an early stage and has a long way to go. 
Therefore, relying on relations continues, and will probably exist despite the 
implementation of rules and regulations.  
 
Earlier, there was only one way to behave; now there are two. It indicates that it has 
caused uncertainty and trust challenges for the managers, rather than opportunities and 
flexibility. Thus, the challenge is mainly to find a balance.  
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSIONS  
7.1 Theoretical contribution 
 
Today international business is inspired by the idea of globalization and sets the world 
as one big market without borders. Globalization has never ended to be a subject of 
international business, however today more than ever this process provides evidence 
that the global marketing concept ignores national differences and the changing aspect 
of other economies. As a result, the challenges for managers in international business, 
particularly in transitioning economies, have not been addressed to a beneficial extent. 
The understanding of international business has so far been a general consideration of 
different cultures. The complication is that they were perceived as rather static and did 
not pay attention to the mobility factor. Our research shows, in transition economies 
there are processes that can challenge the picture of one big market without borders; 
processes such as transitions in governance system. In transition economies processes 
are found to be hybrid. These hybrid systems cause uncertainty and additional 
challenges for the international business processes. This study indicates that transition 
economies are totally different creatures, and thus the concept of one big market 
without borders does not hold. To conclude, it can be stated that for transitioning 
economies the challenge lies not in the shift, but rather finding a balance. 	  	  
7.2 Practical implication  	  
This study was rooted in practical problems, where it aimed to explain the foreign 
managers´ challenges in transition economies. In contrast to rule-based societies, there 
are few academic studies on relation-based societies and their impact on business (Li, 
2009). There are especially few studies conducted on how the transition from a 
relation-based to a rule-based governance system transpires, with the transition phase 
in between these two phases. The findings of this study indicate that China´s transition 
from a relation-based to a rule-based governance system is a complicated matter. 
 
A theoretical insight provided by the study is how emerging and transition economies´ 
ongoing institutional transition impact foreign managers’ trust perceptions. From our 
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empirical findings as well as theoretically, the foundation of trust can be considered as 
context-dependent. Firstly, there is a connection between trust and its relationship with 
the institutional environment and further with corporate governance. Relatively weak 
institutions force companies to hold on to relation mechanisms in corporate 
governance. Institutional pressure from cognitive, normative and regulatory 
mechanisms is immense in transition economies so foreign companies have to adapt to 
external conditions, to prevent failure. However, an interesting finding was that even 
though relations are still highly persevered mechanisms in corporate governance in 
transition economies, the emergence of new rules and their importance have increased 
and hence they have to be followed as well. All things considered, as a result of the 
transition process, a shift from relation-based governance to a more hybrid governance 
system is indicated. This hybrid system makes the transition phase challenging, 
because finding the balance between these two systems is difficult. The challenge is to 
find the balance between being both a relation builder and rule follower at the same 
time.  	  
Firstly, Norwegian managers should understand that a transitioning country continues 
to undergo changes, and thus the findings in this study only refer to the current 
situation. Finding the balance between being a relation-builder and a rule-follower 
would help the managers in a transitioning economy with the unstable environment. 
This research recognizes the significance of maintaining flexibility when managing in 
China. It might also be important for the managers to take into consideration 
management control mechanisms; to direct, monitor, assess, regulate and integrate to 
achieve its objectives.   	  
7.3 Limitations and recommendation for further research 
 
This study has limitations that should be commented on and taken into consideration 
when interpreting the results. 
 
There is no doubt that the limited time and access to resources is a factor in this study. 
In this study the sampling covered only Norwegian managers in big cities such as 
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Shanghai and Beijing, due to limited time. It would be interesting to differentiate 
between company size and industry type in further studies, especially because findings 
indicated that company size could matter. It could also be interesting to find out 
whether a “nation-to-nation” cooperation could give other results, as it was observed in 
the secondary sources that the Norwegian and Chinese government is working to focus 
and to improve certain industries. Surprisingly, these industries turned out to be the 
large companies studied in this research. However limited time did not let us look into 
this factor.  
 
Worthy of mention is the lack of previous research on Norwegian managers’ trust 
challenges and China’s transition from a relation-based society to a rule-based society, 
making the comparison between this study and previous research difficult.  
 
Although the focus was particularly from Norwegian managers‘ point of view, another 
perspective can be from Chinese employees’ and managers’ point of view, where their 
experience of Western culture compared to their own culture can be studied to give a 
better understanding and help Norwegian managers or Western managers for instance. 
Additionally, this research can be used for future studies to understand Chinese 
manager´s challenges in China. Moreover, as the results in this study reflect only the 
current effects of the institutional environment, a longitudinal study would be 
interesting to conduct since China’s transition is evolving over time.  
 
Further, a quantitative method such as a survey would provide statistical data, which 
can give a different perspective between the degree of trust and different trust 
indicators. It will then provide additional understandings of what the main challenges 
are that Norwegian managers face. Comparing the result with secondary data would be 
much easier and yield better results.  
 
However, it should also be underlined that the empirical findings are only from 
successful companies´ managers, thus leaving room for the existence of other 
challenges than those that have been discovered. Therefore, further studies can take 
into account studying Norwegian companies that have failed to establish themselves in 
China, to have a better understanding of the challenges. Future research can include 
firms from other highly developed institutions, to test whether the same challenges 
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occur, and provide more convincing evidence on how the institutional environment 
impact corporate governance. 
 
In order to fill the research gap of how the companies deal with institutional 
differences, it is essential to gather a more comprehensive understanding of the specific 
industry and size of the company. Future studies should adapt strategy to consider what 
can be done to reduce the challenges. It can specify how the institutional environment 
impacts an organization´s strategic decisions.  
 
Furthermore, managers from highly developed institutional countries, such as 
Scandinavian countries, Germany and Netherlands, in other transition economies with 
weak institutions and strong political and cultural background, such as Russia, could be 
used for further study. It will also be interesting for further study to use field studies 
and longitudinal case studies. This will allow the indication of more changes as time 
will pass. Additionally, the same managers could be interviewed again at a later date. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Interview Guide (Highly structured) 
First of all, we would like to thank you for your participation in our research project. 
This interview will be an important part of our master thesis at Bodø Graduate School 
of Business with specialization in International Business and Marketing. Our research 
objective is to investigate on Norwegian managers trust challenges in China. 
 
We want to inform that you are anonymous, only your position, industry and year in 
business as a Norwegian manager in China will be mentioned.  
 
If there are any additional questions regarding this interview, don’t hesitate to contact 
us. 
 
Thank you so much for taking time for this, we truly appreciate it! 	  	  
Your background information 
 
1. Can you tell about your position and work as a Norwegian manager in China? 
 
Name: 
Position: 
Sector:  
Year in business: 
 
2. Can you tell about the importance of relations (guanxi), face (mianzi) and trust 
when doing business in China today? 
2.1 How does it affect your business? 
 
3. Can you tell about your trust to the Chinese government system? 
3.1 How does it affect your business? 
 
4. Have you notice any changes in China and has that affected your business? 
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4.1 How does it impact you as a Norwegian manager in China? 
 
4.2 Has it change your trust perception?  
 
 
Is it possible to contact you and ask additional questions or review topics/questions 
already discussed? 
 
THANK YOU SO MUCH! 
 
Appendix 2: Interview Guide (Semi-structured) 
Introduction: 
 
First of all, we would like to thank you so much for allowing us to conduct this 
interview. This interview will be an important part of our master thesis at Bodø 
Graduate School of Business with specialization in International Business and 
Marketing. Our research objective is to investigate on Norwegian managers trust 
challenges in China. 
 
We want to inform that you will be anonymous, only your position, industry and year 
in business as a Norwegian manager in China will be mentioned.  
 
A transcription of this interview will be sent to you on e-mail, just to make sure that all 
the information is clearly understood. 
 
The interview will be approximately 40-70 minutes with 3 open questions with 
additional small questions. 
 
You can whenever you want cancel the interview.  
If you have any additional questions, feel free to ask during the interview. 
 
Start recording 
 
	   100	  
Background: 
 
1. Can you tell about your position and work as a Norwegian manager in China? 
 
Name: 
Position/title: 
Sector:  
Year in business: 
 
1. Can you tell about the importance of relations (guanxi), face (mianzi) and trust 
when doing business in China today? How does it affect your business? 
 
2. Can you tell about your trust to the Chinese government system and how does 
it affect your business? 
 
3. Have you notice any changes in China and has that affected your business? 
 
3.1 How does it impact you as a Norwegian manager in China? 
 
3.2 Has it change your trust perception?  
 	  
Ask the informant if there are any additional information or questions?  
Are there any possibilities to contact you and ask additional questions or review 
topics/questions already discussed? 
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Appendix 3:  China’s GDP (1995-2015) 
 
Figure 7: China’s GDP (1995-2015), source: Trading economics, World Bank 2015 	  
Appendix 4: Countries with highest GDP (2015) 
 
Figure 8: Countries with highest GDP (2015), Source: Trading economics, World 
Bank, 2015 	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Appendix 5: Economic growth in GDP – top 4 countries 
(1995-2015) 
Economic growth in GDP (1995-2015) 
 
Figure 9: Economic growth in GDP – Top four countries (1995-2015) 	  	  	  	  
Appendix 7: Small and medium-sized enterprises  
Table 10 Small and medium-sized enterprises (European Commission, 2015) 
Enterprise 
category 
Headcount: Annual 
Work Unit (AWU) 
Annual 
turnover 
Or Annual 
balance sheet 
total 
Medium < 250 ≤ € 50 mill. ≤ € 43 mill. 
Small < 50 ≤ € 10 mill. ≤ € 10 mill. 
Micro < 10 ≤ € 2 mill. ≤ € 2 mill. 
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Appendix 6: Norwegian companies in China 
In total, 212 Norwegian companies in China per se. 2014.  
64 companies in Shanghai and 31 companies in Beijing.  
Norwegian companies in China are geographically dispersed, but most of the 
Norwegian companies are located in the big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and 
Hong-Kong. 
 
Table 7 Norwegian Companies in China, Source: Innovation Norway, 2014 
Name City Contact address 
Aalesundfish AS China  Shanghai  http://www.aalesundfish.no/default.asp?menu=13&view=a
pp_person_list&app_id=7&app=7&response=1&body=0  
Aasly Marine's Shanghai 
Office  
Hong Kong, 
Shanghai  
http://www.aaslymarine.no/shanghai%20office.htm  
Aeron Energy and 
Technologies Co., Ltd.  
Shanghai  http://www.aeron.no/aeron_world_wide/  
Aker Cool Sorption (Beijing) 
Technology Ltd.  
Beijing  http://www.akersolutions.com/en/Utility-menu/About-
us1/Corporate-structure/Process-Systems/Aker-Cool-
Sorption-Beijing-Technology-Ltd/  
Aker E&T (Shanghai) Co., 
Ltd.  
Shanghai  http://www.akersolutions.com/en/Utility-menu/About-
us1/Corporate-structure/Engineering/Aker-ET-Shanghai-
Co-Ltd1/  
Aker MH China (Beijing)  Beijing  http://www.akersolutions.com/en/Utility-menu/About-
us1/Corporate-structure/Drilling-Technologies/Aker-MH-
China-Beijing/  
Alpha Boat Manufacturing 
(Zhouzhan) Co., Ltd.,  
Zhoushan (Zhejiang)  
Alu Rehab (Xiamen) Co., Ltd.  Xiamen  http://www.alurehab.com/contact  
AMI ENWA GLOBAL AS  Beijing  
Aqualyng AS  Shanghai  http://www.aqualyng.com/en/Contact/ContactInformation.
aspx  
ARWI Electronics (Suzhou) 
Co.,Ltd.  
Suzhou  http://www.arwi.no/Contactus.aspx  
Aximed  Hong Kong 
(Kowloon)  
http://www.aximed.no/index.php?option=com_content&vi
ew=article&id=91&Itemid=102  
BecoTek Precision Bearing 
Components (Suzhou) Co., 
Ltd.  
Suzhou  http://www.becotek.com/article.asp?uid=21&CID=21  
Belships (Shanghai) Ship 
Management  
Shanghai  http://www.belships-sha.com.cn/contact.htm  
Beta Moss Shipping  Shanghai  http://www.betamoss.com/main.php  
BI (Norwegian Business 
School) Liaison Office  
Shanghai  http://www.fdsm.fudan.edu.cn/nwmbatest/en/Contact.aspx  
Borregaard Shanghai Repr. 
Office  
Shanghai  http://www.borregaard.com/About-us/Addresses/Our-
plants-and-offices  
Bring Logistics Hong Kong 
Limited  
Hong Kong 
(N.T.)  
http://www.bring.com/  
Cambi  Beijing   http://www.cambi.no/wip4/detail.epl?cat=10648  
CANDIS Group Ltd.  Beijing, Hong 
Kong  
http://www.candisgroup.com/  
Car Baby Seat Ltd./Win 
Helmets Ltd.  
Huizhou  
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Collicare Logistics AS-
Shanghai Office  
Shanghai, 
Xiamen  
http://www.collicare.no/avdelinger/category376.html  
Conax  Beijing  http://www.conax.no/en/contactus/  
COPIA  Hong Kong  
CSI Movable Cabinet 
(Changzhou) Ltd.  
Changzhou  http://www.csinorway.com/en_contact.php 
(http://www.czrc.com.cn/njob/company.asp?id=17317)  
Dalian Dyrkorn Fishing Gear 
Company Ltd  
Dalian  http://www.dyrkorn.no/default.asp?page=7962&lang=2  
DEFA Technology (Wuxi) 
Co., Ltd.  
Wuxi  http://www.defatechnology.cn  
DnB Asset Managment Ltd. 
(Hong Kong)  
Hong Kong  
DnB Bank ASA Shanghai 
Branch  
Shanghai  https://www.dnb.no/en/about-us/global 
network/shanghai.html  
Det Norske Veritas AS 
(DNV)  
Beijing, 
Chongqing, 
Dalian, 
Guangzhou,  
http://dnv.com.cn/  
EC Tech China CO., Ltd  Shenzhen  
ECCO (Anhui Ever-Clean 
International Trade Co., Ltd.)  
Hefei  http://www.cn-ecco.com/  
EFD Induction (Shanghai) 
Co., Ltd.  
Beijing, 
Guangzhou, 
Shanghai  
http://www.efd-induction.com/en/Contacts/China.aspx  
Eide Marine Tech/China  Kunshan  http://eidemar.no/contact-us  
Eight Custom Media  Hong Kong  
Ekornes (only through a 
Chinese agent)  
Shanghai  http://www.ekornes.cn/cn/customer_care/contact_informat
ion/  
Elkem Carbon (China) 
Company  
Ningxia  http://www.elkem.com  
Elkem Foundry China  Ningxia  http://www.elkem.com  
Elkem International Trade 
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd.  
Shanghai  http://www.elkem.com  
Elkem Materials processing 
(Tianjin) Co., Ltd.  
Tianjin  http://www.elkem.com  
Elkem: Dehong Elkem 
Material  
Ruili (Dehong)  http://www.elkem.com  
Elopak (Suzhou) Co., Ltd.  Beijing, Suzhou  http://www.elopak.com/language=en/2130/  
Eltek Energy Technology 
(Dongguan) Ltd.  
Dongguan  http://www.eltek.com/wip4/detail.epl?cat=23290  
Eltorque Automation Xiamen 
Ltd.  
Xiamen  http://eltorque.no/contact  
Energy Micro AS  Hong Kong  www.energymicro.com  
ETM Electrical Co., Ltd. 
Jiangsu  
Changzhou  http://www.etman.cn/en/contact.asp?comid=2  
Fearnleys (Astrup Fearnley)  Beijing, 
Shanghai  
http://www.fearnleys.no/index.gan?id=472&subid=0  
Fenwick Shipping Services 
Ltd.  
Hong Kong  http://www.fenwick-shipping.com/contact.htm  
Frank Mohn Shanghai Ltd.  Shanghai  http://www.framo.com/default.asp?k=6&id=36  
FunCom AS Beijing 
Representative Office  
Beijing  http://www.funcom.com/corporate/contact  
Gard (HK) Ltd  Hong Kong  http://www.gard.no/ikbViewer/page/making-
contact/contact?p_dimension_id=18030  
Geno China  Shanghai  http://genocn.com/#ref=http://genocn.com/Inner/NewsPag
e.aspx?id=39  
Genomar Supreme Hatchery 
China Co., Ltd.  
Haikou  http://www.genomar.no/?aid=9078096  
Glamox (Suzhou) Lighting Dalian, http://glamox.com/address-list  
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Co., Ltd  Shanghai 
(salesoffice), 
Suzhou 
(production)  
Goltens Shanghai Co., Ltd.  Dalian, 
Guangzhou, 
Shanghai  
http://www.goltens.com/g-shanghai_contact.htm  
Green Interactions Ltd.  Beijing  
GreenStream Network AS 
Beijing Repr. Office  
Beijing, 
Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, Hong 
Kong)  
http://www.greenstream.net/content/contact-us  
Greenway Technology 
(Xiamen) Co., Ltd.  
Xiamen  http://www.greenwayholding.com/gwxm/Default.aspx  
Grenland Group Asia  Shanghai  http://www.grenlandgroup.com/index.php/about-grenland-
group/locations/shanghai-china  
Grieg Shipping Group AS  Shanghai  http://www.grieg.no/companies/grieg-shipping-group  
GSA Viking Travel Solutions 
Ltd.  
Hong Kong (Kowloon)  
Hako Maskin AS Shanghai 
Repr. Office  
Shanghai  http://www.hakomaskin.no  
Hao Rong Development 
Company, Limited  
Shanghai  http://www.bergengroup.no/?page=133&show=1263  
Havyard Group  Shanghai  http://www.havyard.com/default.aspx?menu=31#  
HTS (Hans Torgersen & Sønn 
AS)  
Huizhou  http://www.hts.no/site/info_4.html  
Hubei Tian En Petroleum Gas 
Transportation Co., Ltd. 
(TNGC)  
Wuhan  http://www.skaugen.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=102&Itemid=125  
Hurtigruten ASA  Beijing, Hong 
Kong  
http://www.hurtigruten.com/Utils/Agents1/Asia3/  
Hydro Aluminium Suzhou 
Co., Ltd. (Suzhou)  
Suzhou  http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Hydro-
worldwide/China/  
Hydro Beijing Repr. Office 
(Beijing)  
Beijing  http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Hydro-
worldwide/China/  
Hydro Building Systems 
Company Ltd. (Beijing, 
Shanghai)  
Beijing, 
Shanghai  
http://www.hydro.com/en/About-Hydro/Hydro-
worldwide/China/  
Höegh Autoliners Ltd.  Beijing, 
Shanghai  
http://www.hoeghautoliners.com/ikbViewer/page/haintern
et/regions/east_asia?p_dimension_id=56676  
I.M. Skaugen SE  Shanghai, 
Wuhan, 
Zhangjiagang  
http://www.skaugen.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=102&Itemid=125  
Industriverktøy AS (IV-
Group, IV-Techmould)  
Suzhou  http://www.industriverktoy.com/index.php?option=com_c
ontent&view=article&id=78&Itemid=103&lang=en  
Innotech Solar AS Shanghai 
Repr. Office  
Hong Kong, 
Shanghai  
http://www.innotechsolar.com/eng/contact_us/  
Integrasco  Chengdu  http://www.integrasco.com/en/contact  
International Trading Partners 
Asia (ITP Asia Ltd.)  
Shanghai  http://www.itpgroup.no/contact/  
Intersys Ltd.  Shanghai  
IV-Techmould Suzhou Co., 
Ltd.  
Suzhou  http://www.nep.com.cn/cms/english/investing%20compan
y/2010-03-02/127.html  
Jiangsu Runwei Electric 
Equipment Co., Ltd.  
Zhenjiang  
Jotun Coatings 
(Zhangjiagang) Co., Ltd.  
Beijing, 
Chengdu, 
Dalian, 
Guangzhou, 
http://www.jotun.com/  
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Shanghai  
Jotun COSCO Marine 
Coating Co., Ltd.  
Dalian, Fuzhou, 
Hong Kong, 
Guangzhou, 
Qingdao, 
Tianjin  
http://www.jotun.com/  
Jotun Xiamen Office  Xiamen  http://www.jotun.com/  
KinaReiser AS Beijing 
Representative Office  
Beijing  http://www.kinareiser.no  
Kitron Electronics 
Manufacturing (Ningbo) Co., 
Ltd.  
Ningbo  http://www.kitron.com/Contact-us/Locations/Kitron-
Electronics-Manufacturing/  
Klaveness Shipping  Shanghai  http://klaveness.com/offices/shanghai-office/  
Kongsberg Automotive 
(Wuxi) Ltd.  
Shanghai, Wuxi  http://www.kongsbergautomotive.com/MediaAndNews/M
ultimedia/locations/  
Kongsberg Maritime China 
(Jiangsu) Co., Ltd.  
Zhenjiang  http://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nobkj0407.nsf/We
bKongsbergSubsidiariesCountry?ReadForm&cat=China  
Kongsberg Maritime China 
(Shanghai) Ltd .  
Shanghai  http://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nobkj0407.nsf/We
bKongsbergSubsidiariesCountry?ReadForm&cat=China  
Kongsberg Maritime China 
(Zhenjiang) Ltd .  
Zhenjiang  http://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nobkj0407.nsf/We
bKongsbergSubsidiariesCountry?ReadForm&cat=China  
Kongsberg Maritime China 
Shanghai Ltd. -Site Office  
Dalian, 
Guangzhou  
http://www.km.kongsberg.com/ks/web/nobkj0407.nsf/We
bKongsbergSubsidiariesCountry?ReadForm&cat=China  
Kristian Jebsens Ltd.  Hong Kong  
Kværner  Beijing  http://www.kvaerner.com/en/About-us/Locations/  
Lærdal Medical (Suzhou) Co., 
Ltd.  
Beijing, 
Hangzhou, 
Hong Kong  
http://www.laerdal.com/cn/Pages/ContactForms.aspx  
Lerøy Seafood Group, 
Hallvard Lerøy Kina  
Beijing  http://www.leroy.no/no/Sales--
Distribusjon/Salgsorganisasjon/Hallvard-Leroy-Kina/  
Leshan Nordic Commercial 
Consultancy Co., Ltd.  
Leshan (Sichuan)  
Lorentzen & Stemoco 
(Greater China) Ltd.  
Hong Kong  www.lorstern.com  
Lorentzen & Stemoco AS 
Repr .Office  
Beijing, Hong 
Kong, Shanghai  
http://www.lorstem.com/Offices/  
Marine Aluminium AS 
(Ningbo) Co., Ltd.  
Ningbo  http://www.m-a.no/ningbo.cfm  
Marine Harvest  Beijing, 
Shanghai  
http://www.marineharvest.com/en/about-marine-
harvest/About-Marine-Harvest1/China/  
Marine International Survey 
Ningbo Ltd.  
Ningbo  http://www.marinsurv.cn/contact_en.asp  
Mascot Power Supplies 
(Ningbo) Co., Ltd.  
Ningbo  http://www.mascot.no/?ItemId=1509  
Motus AS  Guangzhou  http://www.motus.no/  
Mustad Fishing Tackle 
(Wuxi) Co., Ltd  
Wuxi (Jiangsu)  http://www.mustad.com.cn/Index.aspx  
Navslide Trading (Ningbo) 
Co., Ltd.  
Ningbo  http://www.navslide.no/index.php?option=com_content&v
iew=article&id=54&Itemid=65&lang=nb  
NBIM Norges Bank Repr. 
Office  
Shanghai  http://www.norges-bank.no/no/kontakt/adresser/  
Nemko Shanghai Co., Ltd.  Beijing, 
Guangzhou, 
Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, 
Shenzhen  
http://www.nemko.com/asia  
Ningbo Scansafe International 
Trading Co., Ltd.  
Ningbo  http://www.scansafe.no/newsread/scansafe.aspx?nodeid=5
219  
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Noratel  Foshan  http://www.noratel.no/content/view/full/4367  
Norautron Suzhou Co., Ltd  Suzhou  http://www.norautron.cn/index_en.asp  
Nordic Concepts Ltd.  Hong Kong 
(N.T.)  
http://www.nordicconcepts.com.hk/contactus.php  
Nordic Harmony Ltd. Co.  Foshan  http://nordic-harmony.com/frameset.htm  
Nordic Industrial Park, Co., 
Ltd  
Ningbo  http://www.nip.com.cn/  
Nordic Resource Group Ltd  Beijing (post 
address)  
Hong Kong 
(office)  
http://www.nrg.hk/index-4.html  
Nordic Semiconductor ASA  Hong Kong  
Nordic Ways  Beijing, 
Changchun  
http://www.nordicways.com/english/index.php/action_cate
gory_catid_303.html  
Norgas Fleet Management 
Co., Ltd.  
Shanghai  http://www.skaugen.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=102&Itemid=125  
Norminor/Høst  Kunming  http://verdieniavfall.no/  
Norsafe: Jiangyin Norsafe 
F.R.P. Co. Ltd.  
Jiangyin Jiangsu  http://www.norsafe.no/en/About-us/Norsafe-
group1/Jiangyin-Norsafe/  
Norse Dragon Ltd  Hong Kong  http://www.norse-dragon.com/  
Norse Inspection Co., Lt.  Tianjin  http://www.norway-
steel.no/Contactus/tabid/61/Default.aspx  
Norseman (Changzhou) Co., 
Ltd.  
Changzhou  
Norway Shincon Co., Ltd. 
Shanghai Office  
Kunming, 
Shanghai  
http://www.shincon.net/en/contact.php  
Norway-Asia Biotech 
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd  
Shanghai  http://www.noa.cn/contact.asp  
Norwex China Co., Ltd.  Zhangjiagang  http://www.norwex.no/default.aspx?fid=1194  
Nory Pet Co., Ltd.  Shanghai  http://norypcl.en.china.cn/  
NRS - Bridge Construction 
Equipment  
Beijing  http://www.nrsas.com/contact/index.php  
Taicang  
NRS Suzhou Engineering 
Machinery Co., Ltd.  
Taicang  http://www.nrsas.com/contact/index.php  
Odfjell Dong Zhan Shipping 
(Shipping) Co., Ltd  
Shanghai  www.odfjell.no (Odfjell Norway owns 49% shares)  
Odfjell Terminals (Dalian) 
Ltd.  
Dalian  http://www.odfjell.com/Terminals/DalianTerminalChina/P
ages/default.aspx  
Odfjell Terminals (Jiangyin) 
Co., Ltd.  
Jiangyin  http://www.odfjell.com/AboutOdfjell/CorporateInformatio
n/Pages/Odfjell%20Jiangyin%20Terminal,%20China.aspx  
Opera Software ASA  Beijing  http://www.opera.com/company/contact  
Orient Import  Zhongshan  http://www.orientimport.no/?ac_id=50  
OSM Group  Hong Kong, 
Shanghai  
http://www.osm.no/index.php/office-locator/china  
OTRUM Trading (Shanghai) 
Co., LTD  
Shanghai  http://www.otrum.com/?nid=1383  
Overseas Trading & Services 
Co. A/S (OTS-Trading) 
Shanghai Representative 
Office  
Shanghai  
Prediktor (Suzhou) Software 
Co., Ltd.  
Suzhou  http://www.prediktor.no/en/about/contactus/Pages/default.
aspx  
Profileringsspesialisten  Hong Kong, Foshan (Shunde)  
Profilo (HK) Co., Ltd.  Hong Kong  http://www.profilogroup.com/contact-us.html  
Ragasco  Beijing  
Rainpower  Hangzhou  http://www.rainpower.no/about-rainpower/adresses  
Raufoss Technology  Suzhou  http://www.raufossindustripark.no/pbedrifter/raufosstech.h
tml  
	   108	  
Rodskog Shipbrokers Ltd.  Hong Kong  
Rolls-Royce (Shanghai) 
Marine Ltd  
Shanghai  http://www.rolls-royce.com/china/en/activities/contact.htm  
RS Platou Shipbrokers  Shanghai  http://www.platou.com/dnn_site/Shanghai.aspx  
Saferoad Trading AS  Shanghai  http://www.saferoad.com/Countries/China/SafeRoad-
Trading-AS  
Saga Forest Carriers Intl. AS 
Shanghai Office  
Shanghai  http://www.sagafc.com/Default.aspx?Cat=45  
Salabim Restaurant  Shanghai  
Santana Lightships Limited  Hong Kong  
SAS Scandinavian Airlines 
International  
Beijing, Shanghai  
Scana Skarpenord Shanghai 
(Service Station)  
Shanghai  http://www.scana.no/en/companies/scana-skarpenord  
Scana Volda Shanghai Repr. 
Office  
Shanghai  http://www.scana.no/nb/nb/kontakt/adresser  
Scana: Leshan Scana 
Machinery Co.,Ltd (Steel)  
Leshan 
(Sichuan)  
http://www.scana.no/node/205  
Scandinavian Global Limited  Hong Kong  
Scandpower Risk 
Management China Inc.  
Beijing  http://www.scandpower.com/contact_us/our-offices/china/  
Seadrill  Shenzhen  http://www.seadrill.com/about_seadrill/company_addresse
s  
Shanghai Ochun Machinery 
& Equipment Import & 
Export Co., Ltd. (Joint 
venture with Rotek)  
Shanghai  http://shop200911131102676960.en.china.cn/  
Pan Asia Shanghai Branch  Shanghai  http://www.panasiachina.com/panasia/English/shanghaiCo
mpany.asp  
Shenghui Gas Chemical 
Systems Co. Ltd. (I.M. 
Skauge SE)  
Zhangjiagang  http://www.skaugen.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=102&Itemid=125  
Shenzhen Active Co., Ltd.  Shenzhen  http://activesz.sznetsoft.com/lxwm.asp  
Sinodyne Technology 
(Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.  
Hong 
Kong/Shenzhen  
http://www.sinodyne.net/contact.html  
Sino-Norwegian Trading 
(Shenzhen) Co., Ltd.  
Shenzhen  
Skaugen (China) Holding Co., 
Ltd. (I.M. Skaugen SE)  
Shanghai  http://www.skaugen.com/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=102&Itemid=125  
Skipsteknisk  Shanghai  http://www.skipsteknisk.no/default.asp?menu=28  
Skigutane  Shanghai  http://www.skigutane.no/index.php/kontakt-oss/  
Skogstad International Ltd., 
Hangzhou Repr. Office  
Hangzhou  http://www.skogstadsport.com/Kontakt-oss.aspx  
Skuld (Far East) Ltd.  Hong Kong  http://www.skuld.com/Contact/Hong-Kong/  
Sotra Anchor & Chain  Shanghai  http://www.sotra.net/index.php?mapping=53  
Sperre China  Shanghai  http://www.sperre.com/contact  
Statoil  Beijing  http://www.statoil.com/en/About/Worldwide/China/Pages/
default.aspx  
Stolt-Nielsen Transportation 
Ltd.  
Ningbo, 
Shanghai, 
Shenzhen, 
Tianjin  
http://www.stolt-nielsen.com/Our-Business/Map.aspx  
Sto-Nor Industri Shanhai 
Repr. Office  
Shanghai  http://www.sto-nor.no/com/  
Stordal Furniture Flagship 
Store  
Shanghai  http://www.stordal.com/Side.aspx?m=15  
Suzhou Shopex Shop fitting 
Co. Ltd  
Taicang  http://www.shopexchina.com.cn/  
Symbio  Beijing, www.symbio.com  
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Chengdu, 
Hangzhou  
Team Metal Products (Joint 
venture: Team Rustfritt & 
ICS Norway)  
Changzhou  http://teamrustfritt.no/Ansatte.html  
TeamTec Shanghai Co., Ltd.  Hong Kong, 
Shanghai  
http://teamtec.no/partners-agencies/asia  
Teknotherm Refridgeration 
(Wuxi) Co., Ltd.  
Wuxi  http://www.teknotherm.no/hjem/kontakt-oss/  
Telenor Global Services HK 
Ltd.  
Hong Kong  
TKS Ningbo Repr. Office  Ningbo  http://tks-as.no/agri/norsk/mal/index.shtml  
Tomra Systems ASA  Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, 
Xiamen  
http://www.tomra.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=93  
TQM Total Quality 
Management Center Shanghai 
Ltd.  
Shanghai  http://tqmcenter.leanlearning.no/velkommen  
 
